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The Air Defense Laboratory (ADL) Simulation is a software program that 
models the way an air-defense officer thinks in the threat assessment process. 
The model uses multi-agent system (MAS) technology and is implemented in 
Java programming language. This research is a portion of Red Intent Project 
whose goal is to ultimately implement a model to predict the intent of any given 
track in the environment. For any air track in the simulation, two sets of agents 
are created, one for controlling track actions and one for predicting its identity 
and intent based on information received from track, the geopolitical situation and 
intelligence. The simulation is also capable of identifying coordinated actions 
between air tracks. We used three kinds of aircraft behavior in the simulation: 
civilian, friendly and enemy. Predictor agents are constructed in a layered 
structure and use "conceptual blending" in their decision-making processes using 
mental spaces and integration networks. Mental spaces are connected to each 
other via connectors and connecters trigger tickets. Connectors and Tickets were 
implemented using the Connector-based Multi Agent System (CMAS) library. 
This simulation is one of the first applications to use cognitive blending theory for 
a military application. We demonstrated that agents can create an “integration 
network” composed of “mental spaces” and retrieve any mental space data 
inside the network immediately without traversing the entire network by using the 
CMAS library. The results of the tests of the simulation showed that the ADL 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE AIR-DEFENSE LABORATORY SIMULATION 
The Air Defense Laboratory (ADL) Simulation is a software program which 
simulates an Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Officer’s threat assessment process in the 
Combat Information Center (CIC) of a frigate performing air defense. ADL is a 
software cognitive model implemented in the Java programming language. It is 
user-interactive in that it allows users to manipulate input data and create 
realistic air-defense scenarios. The program simulates the mental processes 
performed by an AAW Officer in the threat-assessment phase. It uses multiagent 
systems technology and the Connector Based Multi-Agent Systems (CMAS) 
Library written by the Integrated Asymmetric Goal Organization (IAGO) team at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. The cognitive model implements Conceptual 
Blending Theory as proposed by Turner and Fauconnier[1]. 
The ADL Simulation has two goals, one short-term and one long-term. In 
the short term, the simulation aims to assist air-defense teams to gain insight 
about air-threat assessment and to support the team in decision-making under 
stressful conditions. The air-defense crew may create queries for a specific air 
track and receive advice and predictions about the possible intentions of the 
track from the simulation. Differently from most other approaches in which the 
only final decision is presented, the ADL Simulation also gives the user reasons 
as to why the steps towards a decision are made by traversing backwards each 
node of an "integration network" that is created in the model. In the long term, the 
ADL Simulation aims to improve decisionmaking and air-threat assessment 
duties of the Anti-Air Warfare Officer. Currently in naval technology, the primary 
use of unmanned sensory vehicles is reconnaissance. In the future, when the 
cognitive models like that of the ADL Simulation are embedded in these vehicles, 
they will be able to make decisions and take actions in the field. This would save 
much time, money, and human resources that are currently used. This would 
also limit the placement of humans in dangerous situations and the loss of life or 




Figure 1.   ADL Simulation Interface 
 
B. MOTIVATION FOR THE ADL SIMULATION 
Naval air warfare is the most rapid and intense traditional warfare. If not 
properly executed it could result in severe destruction. The attacker has the 
advantage of speed, flexibility of the attack axis, direction, and time. With a well-
coordinated attack, a ship’s self-defense systems may also be saturated with 
overwhelming data. This requires that a naval unit focus on expertly training their 
air-defense teams and maximize their proficiency level.    
Currently there are two types of training for air-defense teams. The first is 
the training with actual aircraft at sea and the second is training with simulated 
tracks. Even though the simulators are well designed and represent the reality of 
3 
air warfare, they suffer from being a simulation in the air-defense team’s minds 
and do not provide the realistic atmosphere and the factors associated stressful 
conditions. Realistic training requires the use of the actual aircraft and other 
relevant training components, a huge amount of resources, and pre-coordination 
between the air assets and the naval unit. A naval force without an aircraft carrier 
has to arrange all of this coordination. Most of the time, training with real air 
assets is short due to the limited flight time of aircraft. This motivates the need for 
new simulators better representing the real world to assist air-defense teams in 
naval air warfare.  
Another way to increase success in defensive air warfare and to 
compensate for the disadvantage of being on the defensive side is to assist the 
air-defense team in the command-and-control systems in the CIC. These 
embedded systems support the air-defense crew in threat assessment by 
showing threat priorities, sorting threats based on priorities, and reminding the 
air-defense team of the Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) procedures. There 
has been a great deal of work done to increase the efficiency of the supporting 
software embedded in the command-and-control systems. This is especially 
relevant because of two high-profile incidents concerning the USS Vincennes 
and USS Stark. On March 17, 1987 a Mirage F-1 fighter jet, took off from Iraq's 
Shaibah military airbase. It was detected by both USS Stark and an Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane. The attacker Mirage released its 
load and headed to the north but the USS Stark and the AWACS did not detect 
the missiles. On July 3, 1988, 15 months after the previous incident, USS 
Vincennes shot down a civilian Iranian Airliner carrying 290 people after falsely 
identifying it as an attacking aircraft. The reports released after these two events 
clearly revealed the importance of the human factor in air defense. In both 
incidents, the lack of correct decision-making about the situation and situational 
awareness had a catastrophic result.  
After these incidents, U.S. Navy research focused on assisting humans in 
air defense using the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and display technologies. 
The ADL Simulation deals mostly with the AI and aims to assist the air-defense 
4 
crew. The post-Stark and post-Vincennes research supporting air-defense teams 
in the AI field is discussed in Chapter III.  
 
C. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS IN ADL SIMULATION 
The ADL Simulation uses Multi-Agent System (MAS) technology. “A basic 
Multi Agent System (MAS) is an electronic or computing model made of artificial 
entities that communicate with each other and act in an environment.” [2] Agents 
are autonomous software elements operating and interacting with each other in 
that environment.  
MAS’s are comprised of six components: an environment (E) which is the 
space where agents operate, the objects (O) in the environment, actors (A), 
relations (R) between actors and the environment and between agents, 
operations (Ops) that are executed by actors, and laws of the environment.   
MAS = {E, O, A, R, Ops, Laws} 
Agents in a MAS environment receive input from the environment, process 
this input and produce an output. This output is eventually released to the 
environment by the agents. The environment may have more than one agent in it 
and provides communication facilities to all agents. Its architecture is usually 
formulated as sense-process-act.    
The environment in the ADL Simulation is the airspace containing air 
assets and the air-defense ship equipped with satisfactory air-defense sensors. 
One class of objects are the sensory devices of the ship which provide input 
information to threat assessors. There are mainly two kinds of agents in ADL 
Simulation: Real-track agents (offensive) and predictor agents (defensive). Real-
track agents control aircraft activities based on the type of the aircraft. Predictor 
agents receive sensory data produced by real-track agents and generate a 
prediction about the identity and possible intent of the aircraft. Predictor agents 
are designed in a layered architecture. At the very bottom level of prediction, 
reactive agents reside. They are responsible for each factor in air-threat 
assessment, discussed in detail in Chapters III and V. The track agents are 
5 
located above reactive agents and are responsible for combining all information 
provided by reactive agents. Regional agents are above the track agents and are 
responsible for identifying coordinated activities between air tracks. 
Communication between agents is provided by connectors implemented with the 




Figure 2.   ADL Simulation MAS Layout 
 
Predictor agents figure out the identity of the aircraft and their possible 
intentions. There are four kinds of aircraft in the simulation: civilian, military 
friendly, military hostile and user-defined ones. Civilian and friendly aircraft take 
no hostile action and are generated randomly by the Track Manager. User-
defined aircraft are generated via the user interface.  
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The time difference between the initial detection of an air track and the 
time when the air track represents a threat for the ship is relatively short in air 
warfare with respect to other kinds of warfare. This forces the air-defense team to 
evaluate all the sensory data including kinematics of aircraft, history data, the 
geopolitical situation, and intelligence in a short time and carefully. The team 
then must synthesize this information, make a decision about the identity of the 
aircraft, and take appropriate action. Actions are limited to the Rules of 
Engagements (ROE). But ROEs are strict guidelines and usually the actions are 
based on the identities of the contact of interests. Therefore the main task is to 
identify the air tracks and then look up the ROEs to take proper action. Wrong 
identification causes wrong actions as with the USS Vincennes incident. Air 
warfare leaves limited time to make the right decision. Today’s technology has 
brought us computers with ever-increasing speed that can help meet the time 
constraints of air warfare. They are also indifferent to stress which would 
eliminate factors related to human error, i.e. fatigue, making wrong decisions 
under stress, and lack of experience. Calfee in his master thesis at NPGS 
modeled the impact of fatigue, stress and experience on humans in air defense 
using software decisionmaking processes. The results evidently show the 
impacts of human related deficiencies on air warfare. For the above mentioned 
reasons, the ADL Simulation uses computers to resolve problems, help air-
defense teams in identifying tracks, and making correct actions.  
The ADL Simulation differs from previous research in that it uses 
conceptual blending theory for the cognitive model. This theory explains how the 
human brain constructs meaning in the mind. It was primarily developed in 
linguistics and all the examples provided by Turner and Fauconnier come from 
that area. The ADL Simulation is a software implementation of Blending Theory 
in a scientific field. The ADL Simulation has the advantage of using CMAS 
Library to simplify its modeling. Part of the library is support for Connectors and 
Tickets. Connectors are communication devices between agents in the 
environment and let us apply real-like world scenarios to software and create the 
integration network of Blending Theory. Connectors in CMAS library enable 
7 
agents in the environment to communicate with each other without a direct 
relation or a global controller. Tickets are procedural instructions for agents and 
data organizing systems. Connectors and Tickets are discussed in Chapter IV. 
By using these techniques to anticipate the intent of an air contact, the simulation 
comes close to the ways that human CIC personnel create meaning that 
integrates the intent and the possible threat of the air contacts.  
The results of the ADL Simulation showed that the agents in the 
simulation created an Integration network of which the nodes are mental spaces 
containing instant information. The agents made their decision as the way a 
human air-defense officer did in shorter time period and with same accuracy. The 
results opened a new way to extend this project to its second goal. Using CMAS 
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II. CONCEPTUAL BLENDING THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTUAL BLENDING THEORY 
Conceptual Blending Theory proposed by Giles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner is a theory of reasoning in the human brain [3].  How do we understand 
the things happening around us? How do we give meanings to the events? How 
do we combine multiple actions? For many years both scientists and non-
scientific people have been searching for the answers. The short explanation to 
these questions involves evolution, an ongoing process that could last millions or 
billions of years. Most people use their reasoning ability to rationalize the events 
that happen around them without wondering how they are able to do this. We 
take advantage of the fact that we can think rather than questioning why we can.  
Conceptual blending theory is one way of explaining how we think, give meaning 
to what is happening around us, integrate this information, learn, and eventually 
gain experience with age. Blending is the key to this theory. Humans are 
constantly blending as they talk, imagine, listen and in every other action 




Forms are the most common way to represent things around us. One of 
the most commonly used forms is language. People communicate with each 
other with a complex system of forms known as languages. These languages 
may be either verbal languages like English, German, Spanish or some symbolic 
languages like Morse code, flags, searchlights, ASL (American Sign Language), 
or even smoke. We construct sentences, sentences are composed of words, 
words consist of letters, and letters are nothing but little points and lines drawn in 
a particular shape with an associated phoneme. What actually makes everybody 
come to the decision that “a” is “a” is not coming from the nature of the “letter a”; 
which is the combination of some points and lines. It is actually the “form” that we 
wrap around the “letter a”. Since everyone in the world who speaks a Latin 
10 
language knows this form, “a” has the same meaning to everyone that 
recognizes the form. For the people who do not know this particular form, “letter 
a” does not make any sense and similarly for people who do not know the 
searchlight language, it is just a blinking light, not an “SOS” signal.  
Considering symbols as a method of communication, there are diverse  
forms that we use in our daily life. Many of these symbols go unnoticed on a daily 
basis because they are universal.  Forms do not carry meaning themselves. The 
human brain then works to recognize the regularities these forms, assign them 
meanings, and eventually store these meanings in our brains. 
We associate form "wrappers" with the real-world meanings which prompt 
a similar meaning in our brains. On the other hand, two people may give entirely 
different meaning to the same sentence. What makes them think in different 
ways even though the input is the same? The answer to this question brings us 
to Turner and Fauconnier’s “Mind’s Three I’s: Identity, Integration and 
Imagination”. The answer could be a combination of three things: two people 
could identify the input differently, integrate the inputs in a different way, or 
perhaps the new structure that emerged in their brains is dissimilar because their 
varied background experience. For that reason, forms are good but do not 
explaining everything. There must be another way to explain how we make 
meanings. Answer to this question comes from cognitive science researchers 
and linguistics who developed Conceptual Blending Theory.  
 
C. PRINCIPLES OF BLENDING 
Conceptual Blending Theory is a complex theory that explains how 
humans process the information coming from the environment. “Conceptual 
Blending is a set of operations for combining cognitive models in a network of 
mental spaces.” [4] Mental spaces are the principle entities involved in 





• Input space 
• Generic space 




Figure 3.   Conceptual Blending (After [1]) 
   
Mental spaces are instantly built conceptual containers that appear to be 
constructed as we talk, listen, remember, imagine and think [6]. Turner and 
Fauconnier name these containers as “conceptual packets”. Mental spaces 
contain information about a particular domain. The elements of this information 
represent entities of whatever we think or any activity we do. They may be 
related to other elements inside other spaces and may be selectively projected 
into a "blend space" as shown above. In Figure 3, mental spaces are 
represented by circles, black rectangles represent elements, lines between 
elements represent relations between elements, and dashed lines represent 
projections from one mental space to another.   
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Blending is an inference method operating on spaces. There may be more 
than two input space for a blend operation. Generic space contains the common 
input elements of the input spaces as well as the general rules and templates for 
the inputs. The elements of generic space can be mapped onto input spaces. 
Blend space is the place where the emergent structure occurs. The projected 
elements from each input space and generic space create an emergent structure 
in the blend space, possibly something not in the input space. The structure in 
the blend space may be an input for another blend operation as controlled by an 
Integration network. A new emergent structure may contain not only elements 
from the input spaces and generic space but also new emergent elements that 
do not exist in either space [7].  




Composition involves relating an element of one input space to another. 
These relations are called “vital relations”. This matching generally occurs under 
a "frame". Completion is pattern completion in which generic space is involved in 
the blending operation. If the elements from both input spaces match the 
information stored in the generic space, a more sophisticated type of inference 
can be made, a generalization of reasoning by analogy. This is the place where 
we use long-term memory and increase our experiences. Elaboration is an 
operation that creates an emergent structure in the blend space after 
composition and completion. It is also called running the blend. [8] 
“She was so sexy, but he’d heard she was a real cannibal”. [9] 
Considering the sentence above, the word "cannibal" is metaphorical and 
has nothing to do with its original meaning which is “An animal that eats the flesh 
of other animals of the same kind”. [10] When we read this sentence, we can 
figure out that the woman who was referenced is probably interested in the man’s 
money as opposed to his flesh and most likely is using her beauty for this 
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purpose. Disentangling such metaphors and creating newly emergent structure is 
achieved by the elaboration operation.  
We may run blending operations many times for the same input spaces. 
We cannot often reach a useful blend after one blend operation. We do it 
subconsciously many times until we find the best result at the end.   
There is always extensive unconscious work in meaning 
construction, and blending is no different. We may take many 
parallel attempts to find suitable projections, with only the accepted 
ones appearing in the final network…. Input formation, projection, 
completion, and elaboration all go on at the same time, and a lot of 
conceptual scaffolding goes up that we never see in the final result. 
Brains always do a lot of work that gets thrown away [11] 
Not all elements of the input spaces are projected into blend space. This is 
called “selective projection”. This is vital to simplify things. Let’s assume that we 
are looking at a radar scope, following air contacts. There are two input spaces 
for that case: One for the aircraft values and one for the air-defense concept. The 
aircraft input space has aircraft’s properties including the kinematics, mission, 
nationality, type, color. The other input space has the air-defense concept 
elements. At first we pay attention to aircraft’s kinematics and other relevant 
factors. We never think about the color of the aircraft even though it is an 
element of the input space. Identifying the aircraft’s identity does only include 
other elements of input space but not the color. Therefore the blend space which 
is the identity of the aircraft does not include the color of the aircraft unless the 
context requires it. The elements projected onto blend space are selected 
carefully based on the context in which we are being viewed.  
 
D.  NETWORKS OF SPACES IN BLENDING THEORY 
Figure 3 is an example of the simplest integration network involving two 
input spaces, generic space, and blend space. The newly emergent structure 
may be input space for a further blend operation and linked to another network. A 
mental space that has been previously used in the network may also be used 
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again in the following blend operations. This gives the model a coherent structure 
and the ability to explain experience in network form.   
 
Figure 4.   Conceptual Integration Network  
 
An integration network is the focal point of the conceptual blending theory. 
This network consists of groups of mental spaces and eventually constructs the 
meaning in our minds by way of blending operations on mental spaces. “An 
integration network is an array of mental spaces in which the processes of 
conceptual blending unfold”. [12] The network is constructed by finding mappings 
between elements in different spaces; projecting these relations from space to 
space and finally creating an emergent structure that does not exist in either 
space.  
Finding the relations between spaces becomes the most important issue 
to construct identifiable types of integration networks. At first it seems in Figure 3 
that blend space is the most important place of blending theory and therefore 
makes the blender the most important module of the theory. Actually, this is not 
completely true. The ability to find the relations between spaces is more 
important than modeling a blender. These relations are called vital relations in 
blending theory. These relations enable us to combine the two input spaces into 
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one space that is ultimately called compression. Turner and Fauconnier define 
two kinds of relations in blending theory [13]: 
• Inner-space relations: relations inside the blend space 
• Outer-space relations: vital relations between the input mental 
spaces 
The newly emergent structure is constructed in blend space by 
compressing outer-space relations into inner-space relations. Turner and 
Fauconnier have listed vital relations as follows [14]:  
 
These vital relations listed above are mostly used in linguistics. However, 
we can define our own vital relations for an application. Conceptual Blending 
Theory has four kinds of topology for its integration networks of mental spaces 
[15]: 
• Simplex Network 
• Mirror Networks 
• Single-Scope Networks 
• Double-Scope Networks 
The type of topology is primarily related to the organizing frames. The 
similarity of the organizing frames in each input space determines the type of the 
topology. Organizing frames may or may not be the same for both input spaces. 
If they are not the same, clashes occur between input spaces. One of the 




1. Simplex Networks 
Simplex networks have an "organizing frame" in one input space and 
relevant data in the other input space. These networks are good at variable-value 
type of relations. If we have a “track info” organizing frame in one input, the 
speed, heading, location, identity and other variables are represented by the 
elements in one input space. In the other input space there are values for each 
element in the organizing frame. In Figure 5, input space I has the data for the 
speed variable for input space II.  Primarily in this kind of network role-value 
relations are used. Simplex networks basically formalize first-order logic proofs 
as studied in artificial intelligence.  
 
 







2. Mirror Networks 
In mirror networks, both of the mental spaces, generic space and blend 
space, share the same organizing frame. Since both input spaces share same 
organizing frame finding relations between inputs are straightforward. Therefore 
there is no clash between mental spaces in the blending at the level of organizing 
frame. However there may be clashes between subframes of organizing frames. 
[16]  
Turner and Fauconnier explain mirror networks with a comparison of the 
cruise time of two sailing ships leaving San Francisco for Boston. In 1853 the 
clipper ship named Northern Light made this voyage in 76 days 8 hours and this 
was a record time until another modern catamaran named Great America II 
made this distance in shorter time in 1993.  
A few days before the catamaran reached the Boston, the observers were 
able to say that Great America II is 4.5 days ahead of Northern Light [17].  
This sentence discusses two boats racing with each other and one of 
them is 4.5 days ahead of the other one. However, these two boats are not 
competing with each other and they don’t even exist in the same time period. 
When we read this sentence, we can understand that Northern Light was in the 
analogous position in 1853 but 4.5 days later than Great America was. One of 
the inputs to that blend operation is Northern Light cruising in 1853 and other one 
is Great America in 1993. The organizing frame in the blend operation is sailing a 
boat from San Francisco to Boston. Only boats, time periods and position on 
course are projected on to blend space while weather conditions and the aim of 
voyage are not. Time vital relation enables us to associate these two events in 
the same time domain by compressing time. Compression is evaluating two 
events with 140 years time difference in the same space and seeing them as if 
happening at the same time.  
There is no clash between the organizing frames of these two events. On 
the other hand, there are some clashes in the subframes. While one input has a 
nineteenth century cargo sailing boat, the other input has a twentieth century 
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racing catamaran. Both frames clash each other but these clashing properties 
are heuristically ignored in the blend. [18] 
 
 
Figure 6.   Mirror Network (After [1]) 
 
Besides simplex and mirror networks, there are also single-scope 
networks and double-scope networks in blending theory. In single-scope 
networks the two input spaces have different kinds of organizing frames and only 
one of them shows up on the blend space. In double-scope networks the input 
spaces have two different organizing frames again but this time a combination of 
these frames show up in the blend space. 
 
E. NETWORKS IN THE ADL SIMULATION 
The ADL Simulation uses only the simplex and mirror networks. Simplex 
networks are used in assigning vales to variables of air tracks. At the reactive 
level each reactive agent receives its information and triggers another action at 
the predictor track-agent level.  
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Mirror networks are used in various places in the ADL Simulation. They 
are used in "regional" space to figure out coordinated activities between tracks. 
In a coordinated attack scenario, two air tracks are turning inbound at the same 
time. Both of the input space organizing frames are the same: Attacking a ship. 
We can compress these two input spaces with the place and time vital relations 
and find a coordinated attack profile and then project this conclusion onto blend 
space.  
Another place that mirror networks are used in the ADL Simulation is in 
the track-agent level. Consider an air track that is changing its course. We can 
find out the change in course by comparing two heading values in successive 
times. Two input spaces have two different heading values in two different times. 
The organizing frames are same but the time elements of the input spaces are 
different.  
 
F. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO BLENDING THEORY AND CMAS LIBRARY 
FOR ADL SIMULATION 
 Using the CMAS library is not the only way of coordination and 
communication to implement ADL Simulation. An alternative to usage of CMAS 
library is to pass arguments to each other and define methods for each of 
communication links. This may be good for an environment where there are 
many agents. In a mesh topology in where n agents have dedicated point-to-
point links to every other, we need n(n-1)/2 links. For a limited number of agents 
in the environment this number may be acceptable but in ADL Simulation’s 
layered structure there are more than 15 agents for each track. For a 
multithreaded environment this number will multiply itself for dedicated links 
between every agent. The requirement of links and coordination between each 
agent could be a considerable advantage of the usage of the CMAS library. 
Therefore we used CMAS library for coordination and communication between 
























III. RELATED WORK IN NAVAL AIR-THREAT ASSESSMENT 
A. RELATED WORK INTRODUCTION 
We reviewed a variety of previous work that relates to the subject of naval 
air-defense, cognitive modeling, threat assessment and how the human brain 
works. Many studies were conducted after the USS Vincennes and the USS 
Stark incidents to understand the underlying reasons and the factors affecting 
decision-making under stress. While most studies focused on increasing the 
accuracy of decisions made under stress and the performance of watchstanders 
in the Combat Information Center on board ships, there has not been much study 
on a cognitive model for the human contribution to decisionmaking. A few studies 
of how humans do identification and threat assessment suggests that humans 
get inputs from environment, compare them with some predefined templates, and 
then make a decision.  
 
B. ADVERSARIAL PLAN RECOGNITION FOR AIRBORNE THREATS 
A plan recognition system for airborne threats was developed by Richard 
Amori, the Plan Recognition for Airborne Threats (PRAT).[19] PRAT performs 
three-dimensional spatial and temporal reasoning, incorporating a high volume of 
data with predefined patterns via two different kinds of agents. The PRAT system 
used the Falkland war between Argentina and Great Britain in its scenarios.  
The most important module of the system is the Plan Recognizer which is 
an intelligent subsystem. This module is based on physical data and changes to 
this data, known air tactics and behaviors, and likely primary and secondary 
goals. This module has two subcomponents: the Individual-Agent Manager and 
Sets-of-Agents Manager. The former analyzes the data associated with each 
track while the latter analyzes the coordinated activity between air threats. These 
two modules use each other’s inferences so that both can provide mutual support 
for more accurate reasoning. Each of these modules uses "rolling" data 
structures that evolve and are updated continuously. Each data structure has 
forward and backward components. A backward component is supplied with 
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incoming data from the environment while a forward component provides the 
reasoning about the track or tracks. “A backward component permits reasoning 
which is historical in nature, and the forward component permits reasoning which 
is hypothetical in nature”. [19]   
In naval air warfare, a large amount of data needs to be processed. In 
high-threat situations this becomes even more severe. The PRAT system 
addresses this problem by dividing responsibilities into sets of agents. Each 
module is also subdivided into several different mission reasoners.  
The PRAT system is similar to the ADL Simulation in two ways. First, both 
use a layered agent architecture rather than using one type of agent. Secondly, 
both use some common factors to identify track intention and identity like 
kinematics values. One difference between ADL Simulation and PRAT system is 
that the PRAT system uses only kinematics values while the ADL Simulation 
uses additional factors. The ADL Simulation also uses special CMAS data 
structures instead of keeping data in a data structure and traversing this data 
each time to find a match or reason about existing history data as in the case of 
PRAT.   
 
C. NAVAL AIR-DEFENSE THREAT ASSESSMENT: COGNITIVE 
FACTORS AND MODEL 
Another investigation examined the cognitive aspects of naval air-threat 
Assessment. Experienced US Navy Air-defense personnel were used in this 
research. Collected data revealed that participants assigned threat and priority 
levels to air tracks by using a set of factors.  
Factors are elements of data and information that are used to 
assess air contacts. Traditionally, they are derived from kinematics, 
tactical, and other data. Examples of such data include course, 
speed, IFF modes, and type of radar emitter. [20] 
The major factors were electromagnetic signal emissions, course, speed, 
and altitude, point of origin, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) values, intelligence, 
airlane, and distance from the detector.  Participants used up to 22 factors, and 
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each used different but overlapping factors. Participants used more factors in 
identifying tracks posing a greater threat than tracks posing a lesser threat. 
Participants used the factors in a certain order in threat assessment and each 
factor had a priority.      
 Each factor has an expected range of values. Research showed that 
aircraft that matched these expectations were assigned lower threat levels than 
aircraft that did not. Figure 7 shows a threat assessment model derived from the 
research.  
 
Figure 7.   Cognitively-Based Model of Threat Assessment (From 
[20]) 
     
The ADL Simulation uses the factors found in this research in its reactive 
agents in the threat assessment process. The ADL Simulation improved on this 
model by adding an integration network and the ability to evaluate coordinated 











Figure 8.   Threat Assessment Model (From [22]) 
 
The factors in the previous model are mentioned as cues in another study. 
Each cue has a weight and if the perceived data is unexpected, the value of the 
active model is reduced by the weight of the clue. Other studies discussed in this 
paper includes Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS), the Decision 
Support System (DSS), and the Basis For Assessment (BFA) concerning the 
development of more efficient tactical displays and human interfaces for air-
defense personnel. These studies showed that if the most important data is 
shown to the user more effectively, accuracy is increased in threat assessment.  
The following results were found in the research: 
• Users created templates to define which cues will be evaluated and 
the permissible range of data for each cue. 
• Cues were: 
• Evaluated in a fairly consistent order; 
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• Weighted; 
• Processed in sets reflecting their weights. 
• Air-defense threat evaluators: 
• Did not rely on all data, only the data associated with cues in 
their active template; 
• Did not change templates in the face of conflicting data; 
• Were influenced by conflicting data in specific cues rather 
than in the overall pattern. 
• Perceived threat level: 
• Was related to the degree of fit of observed data to expected 
data ranges in the evaluator’s active template; 
• Was not related to the number of cues that were evaluated 
during threat assessment [23]. 
 
E. SIMULATION OF AN AEGIS CRUISER COMBAT INFORMATION 
CENTER 
Other previous work reports on a simulation that models the CIC of an 
Aegis Cruiser for air defense. The research mainly explores the team’s 
performance under high-stress situations and tries to understand the 
interpersonal factors that affect the overall performance of the CIC team and 
watchstanders. Air-defense contact identification, threat assessment, and 
classification were modeled but were not the primary focus of the research. An 
artificial neuron is used to model the cognitive decision-making process. 
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Figure 9.   Contact Classification Artificial Neuron (From [24]) 
 
Each contact category has a threshold value for classification and threat 
level. The threat level may be White, Yellow or Red. Each input value has a 
weight and weighted sum is compared to a threshold. The scoring values and 
thresholds were constructed in compliance with air-defense personnel from the 
ATRC detachment in San Diego, CA.  The threshold values are displayed below: 
 




Table 2.   Scoring (Weighted) Values for Various Input Cues(From [24]) 
 
 
F.  MULTISENSOR DATA FUSION 
Another relevant study discusses data-fusion techniques, collecting data 
from multiple sources and combining them to achieve more accurate results than 
could be achieved from a single sensor alone. Data fusion has military 
applications (e.g. finding track identity and establishing a tactical picture) and 
non-military applications (e.g. robotics, automated control of smart buildings, 
weather monitoring, and medical applications).  Air-threat assessment involves 
data fusion since air-defense personnel have to combine information from 
multiple sensors and evaluate them.  
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To establish target identity, a transformation must be made between 
observed target attributes and a labeled identity. Methods for identity 
estimation involve pattern recognition techniques based on clustering 
algorithms, neural networks, or decision-based methods such as Bayesian 
inference, Dempster-Shafer’s method, or weighted decision techniques. 
Finally, the interpretation of the target’s intent entails automated reasoning 
using implicit information, via knowledge-based methods such as rule-
based reasoning systems [25].  
   The fusion in the ADL Simulation used a combination of a neural 
network in the form of an integration network and an evidence weighting 
algorithm. An integration network is used by the Conceptual Blending Theory. 
The models that reside in the nodes of this network are weighted based on some 
Bayesian inferences.  
This study also suggests Blackboard Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) 
as a good data-fusion method. These systems partition the problem into 
subproblems and use constrained interaction between solutions of subproblems 
to solve whole problem. This is analogous to how human experts come to a 
solution by gathering in front of a blackboard and brainstorming. A KBS must 
have three required elements: 
a. Knowledge representation schemas 
b. An automated inference/evaluation process 
c. Control schemas 
The first and third requirements are provided by Generic Space while the 
second requirement is done by the blender in Conceptual Blending Theory. Thus 
the method used in ADL Simulation (Conceptual Blending Theory) fulfills the 
requirements of a KBS. At the same time, the ADL Simulation is a cognitive 
model for how humans accomplish these functions.   
 
G. MULTISENSOR DATA FUSION 
Another study about multi-sensor data fusion distinguishes three kinds of 
data fusion: data, feature, and decision. For data fusion, raw data from each 
sensor is combined in a centralized manner. This is claimed to compute the most 
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accurately of the three. The drawback of this method is the requirement that all 
sensor values must be put in the same units. If sensors are distributed in the real 
world, all the information from all of the sensors must be transmitted to the 
center, which requires a large bandwidth. In feature-level fusion, features are 
extracted in each sensor and these features are transmitted to the center. In this 
case communication requirements are reduced but the result is less accurate 
because of the lost information during generating features from raw data. Finally, 
in decision-level fusion, each sensor sends a decision about its input and these 
decisions are fused. The result is the least accurate of the three fusion options 
because of the information compression of the sensor observations, but requires 
the least bandwidth.  
In ADL Simulation, predictor track agents are like local sensors focused on 
individual aircraft tracks.  They are using feature-level fusion in which sensors 
are represented as reactive agents. Predictor agents thus infer the identity of the 
aircraft based on the features sent by the reactive agents. At the same time, 
regional agents identify coordinated activities between aircraft and collect data 
from track agents, doing something like decision fusion. Thus, different levels of 
data fusion are used in the ADL Simulation.  
 
H. COMPARISON WITH OTHER AIR-DEFENSE  WORK 
In summary, the ADL Simulation is unique for the following reasons:  
• It uses Conceptual Blending Theory to imitate a human brain.  
• ADL Simulation uses a Connector Based Multi-Agent System to 
create an integration network. 
• The ADL Simulation allows a user to set up an arbitrary 
geographical area to test. 
• It is structured with a layered design. 
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• The ADL Simulation can use both analog and digital approaches to 
inference to permit studying the precision losses that come with 
digitization.  
• Its results are stored in an XML file which enables studying this 
data.  
• It allows a user to see the decisionmaking process in a step-by-step 
manner and give reasons for decisions.  A user may see all 









IV. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF AIR 
DEFENSE LABORATORY SIMULATION 
A. PROGRAM LANGUAGE AND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR  ADL 
SIMULATION 
The ADL Simulation is written in the Java programming language. It was 
developed using the JBuilder 9 Application Development Environment. The Java 
Development Kit 1.4.1_02 is used for the implementation of the program. The 
program was run on a Pentium 4, 2.4 GHz. machine with 512 megabytes (MB) of 
RAM. The requirements to run the program are as follows: 
• Pentium 3 or equivalent and higher processor 
• Minimum 512 MB of RAM  
• Java Development Kit 1.4.1 or higher 
• Screen display of 1280x1024 pixels or higher  
The program is based on a multi-threaded environment: There are more 
than 100 threads running in a five-track scenario. Therefore a processor with 
high speed and large amount of RAM is a requirement for the program to run 
smoothly. The SPY XML Editor was used to monitor data logging information and 
XSLT transformations. XML files are used to store data logging information.   
 
B. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS AND THE CMAS LIBRARY 
1. Agents 
A multi-agent system (MAS) is a computing model made of entities that 
communicate with each other and act in an environment. [2] Agents are 
autonomous software elements operating in an environment.  Multi-agent 
systems have six components: an environment (E) which is the space where 
agents operate, the objects (O) in the environment, actors (A), relations (R) 
between actors and the environment and relations between agents, operations 
(Ops) that are executed by actors, and laws of the environment.     
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Agents in a multi-agent system environment receive input from the 
environment, process this input, and produce an output. Then the agents release 
the output back to the environment. This kind of architecture may be basically 
formulated as sense-process-act.    
According to Integrated Asymmetric Goal Organization (IAGO) team at 
NPS there are three kinds of agents: reactive, cognitive, and composite.  The 
actions taken by reactive agents only rely on the current input data, and these 
agents do not use memory or experience. Therefore there is no learning 
capability in reactive agents. They are good at basic implementations (e.g. 
thermostats or alarms).  
Cognitive agents maintain a state of information and knowledge which 
permits them to operate in conjunction with the memories and experience gained 
so far.  Composite agents are composed of both reactive agents and cognitive 
agents, typically in a hierarchy. Such agents communicate with the inner 
environment of the host agent as well as the outer environment. Inner agents 
maintain an insight model and internal states for host agent. 
An alternative taxonomy gives four kinds of agents: simple reflex, 
environment trackers, goal-based, and utility-based. Simple reflex agents are 
associated with the definition of reactive agents. Agents that keep track of the 
environment have some sort of state information but they are not quite cognitive 
enough. Goal-based agents address certain kinds of goals. Utility-based agents 
try to make agents happy on the way to the goal. While goal-based agents use 
only one path to a goal, utility-based agents use the most effective path.  
 
2. Connector Based Multi-Agent Systems and CMAS Library 
a. Connectors 
Connectors are one way to do communication and coordination 
between agents. They are a particular kind of message passing system. [26][27] 
Only the agents with the same namespace of the source agent may receive the 
data through the connectors. Naming the connectors with a namespace provides 
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an addressing facility in the communication between agents. There are three 
different states for a connector: retracted, extended, and matched. 
Retracted connectors are the ones that are not broadcast by 
agents. They cannot be matched to another agent. Such a connector may be 
retracted because the connector could not match in a certain time, the conditions 
that created the connector have changed, or the conditions have not yet been 
met to extend the connector. In an extended connector, the inner state 
information is made available to the outside environment for another agent with 
the same kind of connector to match. Matching connectors may fire an action or 
change the state of a data structure in an agent. 
 
Figure 10.   Connector States 
 
One could question that there are other many ways proposed for 
agents to communicate. A general message passing could be used to 
communicate the agents. During the research before we received the library we 
used a general message passing method. As the project got bigger the amount 
of code also increased. After we received the CMAS library, we used connectors 
to communicate and coordinate the agents inside the simulation. With the CMAS 
library, we decreased the amount of code for coordination and communication of 
agents. This enabled us to focus on the model rather than the coordination of 
agents. For our second goal, use of the CMAS library enables us to extend the 




Tickets are procedural instructions for agents and data organizing 
systems. There are basically two kinds of tickets: data and procedural.  Data 
tickets organize the data structures inside an agent. These tickets have different 
kinds of frames. These frames may include names, types, and type-value pairs. 
The status of a ticket is determined by the status of each frame inside the ticket.  
Data tickets may be used as a trigger to fire an action when a set of data is 
matched with predefined criteria.  Procedural tickets have methods to be 
executed. When certain conditions are met the methods in these frames are 
executed in the ticket.  
Both data tickets and procedural tickets have two states: completed 
and incomplete.  A data ticket may be completed when either all of the frames in 
the ticket are “set” or a predefined subset of all frames is “set”. Procedural tickets 
may be completed when either all of the frames are executed or a subset of them 
is executed. The frames that have to be set or executed to make a ticket 
complete are called primary frames. 
A ticket may also be sequential or non-sequential. Sequential ticket 
frames must be completed in sequence while frames may be executed or set out 
of order in a non-sequential ticket. In a sequential ticket, each frame may set or 
fire the other frame to set or execute. The tickets in which the all frames have to 
be set or executed without interruption are called synchronous tickets, or must-
complete tickets. Tickets in which the frames may be set or executed in any time 
are called asynchronous tickets. 
There are other ways to associate procedural and logical 
information with an agent. Plans, rules, and scripts are some of them. The 
difference between them and tickets are that tickets are more abstract. We can 
do more things with tickets. Tickets retain the plans, scripts, rules, and data 
structure of an agent. Most of the implementation of tickets in CMAS library is 
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interfaces not classes. Tickets of the library are left to user to be implemented 
based on the context.   
 
c. Ticket & Connector Structures 
Tickets and connectors may be used together to achieve various 
kinds of design options and complete coordination between agents. Connectors 
may be used to activate a ticket. This kind of relation may be a precondition for 
the ticket. After some certain conditions are provided tickets are activated and 
the frames in the ticket are executed.  
Connectors may be used as a trigger for methods implemented in 
procedural tickets or to set data structures in data tickets. Then connectors are 
gates to individual frames inside the ticket. Once a connector is matched with 
another one, methods in frames in a ticket may be fired. In that sense connector 
matching acts like a function call.  An action taken by a frame inside a ticket may 
be a trigger for a different frame inside another ticket. Then output which is 
released from a frame of a ticket may be connected to an additional frame inside 
another ticket.  
Many MASs are nested agent systems. At the very bottom level, 
reactive agents are the working units. Above them is there another agent system 
with more cognitive agents and so forth. Each agent system makes their own 
decisions in their local area called a "membrane" or context. The relations with 
upper and lower level membranes are provided by connectors. These connectors 
enable systems to be generalized. With generalization, agent systems can not 
only affect their little environment but also affect the outside environments and 






d. The CMAS Library 
CMAS library was written by Neal Elzanga for the IAGO at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. This library enables users to define five types of 
connectors: String, Integer, Double, Float, and Boolean connectors. Each 
connector must be given a namespace to enable matches in the CMAS library. 
These namespaces stands for membrane. If the connectors are registered to 
CMAS library, any query with registered namespace in the software can reach 
the value of the connector if the connector status is extended. That enables the 
user to communicate the agents between each other without implementing an 
external connection inside the software. CMAS library also enables the user to 
define tickets. Both data and procedural tickets are implemented in the CMAS 
library. The library and IAGO project is still on progress at Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
 
C. MENU OPTIONS 
The ADL Simulation user interface has four main components as shown in 
Figure 11: menu options, output panel, toolbar, and tactical display.  
The tactical figure has four drop-down menus. These menu options allow 
a user to specify the environment, create and delete airbases, air routes, and 
joint points, create user-derived aircraft, load a pre-prepared scenario, save a 
prepared scenario, and create an Air Tasking Order (ATO) message for friendly 
activity in the environment. ATO Messages are prepared by the Air Force or 
Naval Force holding air assets in their force on daily basis, and this message 
informs all friendly forces of the friendly air activity in the area with time frame, 





Figure 11.   Visual Design of the ADL Simulation 
 
 
One submenu opens a new window for the user to define the tactical 
scenario for the simulation. The user can create an environment by adding 
airports, joint points, and air routes between these points (Figure 12).  The 
simulation finds the shortest path from each airport to every possible airport and 
stores them as waypoints. The method used to find the shortest route is a 
combination of the A* and Depth First Search (DFS).  
The user can also create a track by specifying the waypoints on this panel. 
The user can specify the altitude, speed, IFF Transponder status, IFF values, 
radar status, and radar emission on this panel. Agents controlling the actions of 
the aircraft adjust the altitude and speed of the aircraft based on the values on 
the waypoints. IFF and radar status changes on the waypoints are based on the 
geographic location of the aircraft. 
Another menu option loads the default scenario from the hard disk. This 
scenario includes the location of airports, joint points and the routes connecting 
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them. This enables the user to test the same scenario multiple times without 
recreating the same environment.  The user can also create an ATO message.  
 
 
Figure 12.   Tactical Figure Control Panel 
 
There are four submenus under the Track Generator: Generate Tracks, 
Add Coordinated Attack with Snooper, Add Coordinated Detachment Attack, and 
Add Missile Attack. The user can define the maximum number of randomly 
generated tracks in the environment. User derived tracks, the snooper, 
coordinated detachment attack track, and missile attack track are not included in 
this number. The user can also define the percentages of the types of aircraft on 
this panel.  
 
Figure 13.   Track Generator Panel 
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The snooper is an opponent aircraft charged with collecting intelligence in 
a given area. These aircraft orbit at a specific location and they stay out of 
effective weapon range of the ships to protect themselves from surface 
engagements. They pinpoint the location of surface contacts for striker aircraft. 
The snooper track is an actor of one of the coordinated attack scenarios of the 
simulation. The location and behavior information of the snooper is loaded into 
the simulation when this particular option is selected.  
An enemy aircraft can also be created in an expected threat sector. When 
the distance is about 30 nm, this track is split and another track shows up on the 
screen. They change their direction 20° away from the initial course but each one 
in a different direction. When the surface ship is on their beam, both aircraft 
return inbound and attack the ship. After the engagement is completed both 
tracks fly away from the ship and merge again. The scenario figure is shown 
below.  
 
Figure 14.   Coordinated Detachment Attack 
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An enemy aircraft loaded with Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM) can be created 
in the expected-threat sector. It directly approaches ships until its range is about 
30 nm. Then the aircraft releases its missile and turns away from the ship. This 
action is simulated in the ADL Simulation by splitting the air track.  
The user can choose to turn the datalog option on or off and define the 
datalog frequency to store track agent information to an XML file. The ADL 
Simulation periodically stores all the information to an XML file if the datalog is 
turned on. The Analog & Digital selection panel enables the user to select the 
criteria for the evaluation process at the predictor-agent level and reactive-agent 
levels 
The evaluation of model panel shows the integration network created by 
the ADL Simulation for the regional agent and the selected track. The integration 
network is represented in a tree structure. The user can traverse on the tree and 
see the steps of decisionmaking process. Each node of the tree represents a 
mental space defined in the blending theory. The user can see the compression 
of blending theory by expanding the tree downward. 
The user can also set the threshold values for speed, CPA, and the range 
evaluation process under a menu option. These values are used when digital 
evaluation is selected on the Analog & Digital Selection Panel. These values are 
used when digital evaluation is selected on the Analog & Digital Selection Panel.  
The ADL Simulation can be used either in user mode or model mode. 
When user mode is selected, the identities of the tracks are changed by the user. 
We defined this mode for testing the simulation. This mode can also be extended 
to perform training of air-defense personnel. In this mode the competing models 
feedback panel does not show the weights of the competing models. When the 
model mode is selected the identities of the tracks in the simulation is changed 
by the model.  
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Figure 15.   Evaluation of Model Panel 
 
There are two submenus under the Intelligence menu: Setup IFF and 
Setup Threat Intelligence. IFF is used as an electronic identification method to 
identify air assets. IFF-1 values show the mission type of the aircraft. IFF-2 
values are used to specify the aircraft identification number. IFF-3 values are 
used by both civilian and military aircraft to identify which Air Traffic Control Unit 
is controlling the aircraft. The user can choose to load default values. The user 
can define the threat expected sectors in the simulation via the Threat 




D. TOOLBAR OPTIONS 
A track can be selected by clicking on it. Once the track is selected a red 
square is drawn around it. The selected track’s location, bearing, and range 
values can be observed on the Selected Track Information in the output panel. 
The “Track Data” button in the tool bar at the left side of the tactical display 
opens another track data frame.  
 
Figure 16.   Track Info pages 
The track Info frame has four pages presenting sequentially kinematics, 
description, IFF, and agent info displays. The Description display is prepared for 
the user mode of the simulation. The user can change and add additional identity 
information of the track. The agent info page has access to four different frames: 
Regional agent connectors, track agent connectors, reactive agent connector 
and track agent tickets and finally competing models.  
The regional agent connectors frame shows all the extended connectors, 
extended queries, and matched connectors of regional agents. The user can see 
the insight of the blending operation of the ADL Simulation at the regional agent 
level by traversing the data stored in this frame. Other frames show all the 
extended connectors extended queries and matched connectors of individual 
track agent and reactive agents. The user can see the current status of the 




Figure 17.   Regional Agent and Track Agent Connectors Frames 
 
 The weight of each identity ticket can be observed on the Competing 
Models Frame. Each identity’s weight is drawn by a figure with different colors. 









The Simulation starts by creating the tracks based on the numbers 
entered in the Track generator panel. These tracks randomly pop up on the 
screen. The simulation may be paused by the pause button. Pause button puts 
all threads working in the simulator in sleep mode.   
 
E. OUTPUT PANEL 
The output panel has three subpanels: the data panel, the selected track 
panel, and the competing-models feedback panel. The data panel presents the 
location, range and bearing of the mouse on the tactical display. This panel also 
allows the user to enter a track number to set it as the selected track. After a 
track is selected by clicking on it or entering the track number into the Track 
Number field in the data panel, its location, bearing, and range values can be 
observed on the selected track subpanel. The competing-models feedback panel 
shows the current weight of all competing models. 
 
Figure 19.   Simulation Output Panel 
 
 
F. JAVA XML INTEGRATION 
We integrated java and XML with JDOM beta9. JDOM is an open source 
API enabling writing, reading, and manipulating of XML files inside Java code. 
JDOM is not the only API available for Java-XML integration; there are DOM and 
SAX available for integration. We chose JDOM because it was simple to use and 
the JDOM API methods are following the same philosophy of existing Java API. 
It combines the advantages of two other API. JDOM is compatible with the 
classes of Java API. It is using the Collection class of Java API. The only 
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drawback of JDOM is that JDOM is limited to Java. It is not a platform free API 
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V. DESIGN OF THE ADL SIMULATION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION   
There are two types of track agents in the ADL Simulation: Real track 
agents (modeling aircraft) and predictor track agents (modeling air-defense 
personnel). Real track agents have full control of the behaviors of the air tracks. 
They determine the actions that the aircraft will take. They have full access to 
track information and can modify them. Predictor track agents only can change 
the predicted identity value of the aircraft. They cannot change any other variable 
of the tracks. Predictor agents also can only receive the kinematics values of 
aircraft (location, speed, heading etc.), IFF values that the aircraft responds to 
interrogations, ESM values received from the aircraft, and intelligence 
information.  
Predictor agents are designed in a layered structure to enable ease of 
implementation, to include every possible detail and to be able to use the 
membrane property of CMAS library. The membranes allow agents to operate in 
separate environments. There are three layers in the ADL Simulation: the 
regional-agent layer, the track-agent layer, and the reactive-agent layer. While 
there is one track agent and reactive agent for each track in the environment, 
there is only one regional agent for all tracks.  
 
B. REAL TRACK AGENTS 
Real track agents determine what actions that the aircraft will take at a 
specific location and time. Some of the decisions are determining the next 
waypoint, determining the point to turn, increasing or decreasing the speed and 
altitude, turning on/off the radar and IFF transponder, and commencing attack. 
There are seven main types of real track agents. The details of the 
implementation of the behaviors of the aircraft is based on our experience, 
tactical procedure publications, and air warfare game documents 
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1. Civilian Aircraft Track Agent 
The civilian aircraft track agents’ mission is to take off from an airport and 
follow air routes to the destination airport. Takeoff and destination airports are 
picked randomly. Typical values for a civilian aircraft are shown below. 
 
Attribute Behavior 
Takeoff and destination 
airbases 
Randomly chosen 
Speed Initial : 100 
Max Speed: 400 + random number (1-75) 
Max Acceleration 10-12 
Altitude Max 30000 Ft. 
IFF-2 0 
IFF-2 0 
IFF-3 Random number (1-9999) 
IFF-4 False 
Radar Status On 
Radar Emission Civilian Radar Emission 
Turning angle 2° 
IFF Transponder status On 
 
Table 3.   Civilian Aircraft Attributes and Behaviors 
 
A civilian track agent finds its waypoints by using a combination of A* 
search and Depth First Search (DFS). At each step, the track agent measures 
the distance to the next waypoint and determines the course to reach the next 
waypoint. When the aircraft comes to the turning point, it turns to a new waypoint 
with its turning angle. The turning angle is the amount the aircraft  in one tenth of 
a second. Based on the speed and course, new location points are calculated 
and track position is set to these points. On the last waypoint the aircraft starts 
decreasing altitude and speed, and subsequently finishes its mission by landing 





2. Friendly Aircraft Track Agent 
The friendly aircraft's mission is to fulfill a randomly chosen task. There 
are ten friendly tasks. Every friendly mission must be defined by an Air Tasking 
Order message. If no task is defined in such a message by the user, a randomly 
generated task is generated by the simulation and inserted in the message. The 
friendly tasks are as follows: 
 
Task Behavior 
OCA Sweep An Offensive Counter Air sweep mission is an Air-to-Air 
mission and its intent is to shoot down enemy aircraft. 
RECON A Reconnaissance mission’s intent is to take pictures in a 
given area or on a path.  
CAS A Close Air Support mission supports the army in ground 
attack missions. 
BARCAP A Barrier Combat Air Patrol mission’s intent is to protect a 
given area from enemy attacks. 
Deep A Deep mission’s intent is to attack enemy units in enemy 
territories. 
OCA An Offensive Counter Air mission’s intent is to attack enemy 
airfields. 
BDA A Battle Damage Assessment mission’s is to check the target 
status after the attack is completed. 
SEAD A Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission’s intent is to 
attack enemy air-defense units such as SAM launchers. 
DCA A Defensive Counter Air mission’s intent is to protect AWACS 
or a High Value Unit (HVU) from enemy attacks. 
ESCORT An Escort mission’s intent is to protect a given unit from enemy 
attacks. 
 
Table 4.   Friendly Aircraft Missions [28] 
 
The OCA Sweep and RECON missions are path missions. They have 
certain waypoints randomly chosen by the track agent. Other missions are area 
missions: Aircraft are given a certain area to stay inside during the task period. 
We did not implement the detailed specification of each task. From the point of 
view of an air-defense officer, an aircraft’s activity is less important once its 
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identity is known. For that reason we divided the missions into path-based 
missions and area-based missions. The real track agent’s mission is to make 




Mission Randomly chosen 
Speed Initial : 100 
Max Speed: 500 + random number (1-100) 
Max Acceleration 10-17 
Altitude Based on mission. Around 20000 Ft. 
IFF-1 Determined by ATO message 
IFF-2 Determined by ATO message 
IFF-3 Determined by ATO message 
IFF-4 True 
Radar Status On 
Radar Emission Military Radar Emission 
Turning angle 4° 
IFF Transponder status On 
Origin Safe sector 
 
Table 5.   Friendly Aircraft Attributes and Behaviors 
 
 Every friendly activity originates from a friendly country and their IFF-4 
value is true with very high probability. When the mission is completed, the real 
track agent sends the aircraft toward the friendly country and it leaves the radar 
scope. 
 
3. Enemy Aircraft Track Agent 
An enemy aircraft track agent randomly picks one of the enemy missions 
and executes the requirements of this task. All of the enemy aircraft take off from 
the "threat expected" sector except for the aircraft that have chosen a terrorist 
attack mission. If there is no threat-expected sector defined in the simulation, the 
attack origin is selected randomly. These aircraft use randomly picked IFF-1, 2, 
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and 3 settings. The IFF-4 value is false for enemy aircraft with very high 
probability. The enemy missions are: 
 
Task Behavior 
HADB Attack High Altitude Dive Bomb attack  
DB Attack Dive Bomb attack 
Popup Attack Low attack profile 
Terrorist Attack Specialized terrorist attack profile with a civilian aircraft 
 
Table 6.    Enemy Aircraft Missions [28] 
 
An HADB attack is a medium attack profile. Aircraft begin to attack at 
22,000 ft. and fly towards the ship. When the distance is 15 nm, the aircraft 
makes a 15° turn. When the ship is about 60-90° relative bearing from the ship’s 
heading, the aircraft turns inbound and executes the attack on the ship.  A DB 
attack is another medium altitude attack but it starts at an altitude of 10,000 ft. A 
pop-up attack is a low altitude attack. The aircraft approaches the ship at a low 
altitude and flies towards the ship until the range is 7 nm. At a 7 nm distance to 
the ship, the aircraft makes a 30° turn away from the ship. When the ship is at 
30° relative bearing from the aircraft heading, the aircraft pulls up and increases 
its altitude. At 5000 ft. the aircraft turns inbound and starts decreasing its altitude 
and executes the attack. [28]  
In a terrorist attack scenario, the enemy aircraft behaves like a civilian 
aircraft. It takes off from a randomly picked airport and its destination is another 
randomly picked airport. This scenario is prepared to suggest a terrorist attack 
like those of September 11, 2001.  During its flight, the real track agent calculates 
the nearest point to the ship on the air route. At this point the aircraft suddenly 
turns inbound and decrease its altitude. This action gives the predictor agents a 
short reaction time to identify the aircraft’s behavior. Terrorist attack 
specifications are otherwise the same as civilian aircraft. The enemy military 




Mission Randomly chosen 
Speed Initial : 100 
Max Speed: 500 + random number (1-100) 
Max Acceleration 10-17 
Altitude Based on mission. Around 20000 Ft. 
IFF-1 Randomly chosen 
IFF-2 Randomly chosen 
IFF-3 Randomly chosen 
IFF-4 False 
Radar Status On 
Radar Emission Military Radar Emission 
Turning angle 4° 
IFF Transponder status On 
Origin Threat-expected sector 
 
Table 7.   Enemy Aircraft Attributes and Behaviors 
 
 
4. Coordinated Detachment Attack Track Agent 
The coordinated detachment attack track agent executes a coordinated 
attack on a ship. It was developed to test the coordinated activity detection of the 
regional agent. This agent handles three activities: detachment, split, and 
merges. At first only one aircraft is detected on the radar screen. Actually there 
are two aircraft but since they are so close to each other and the range is so 
long, the radar sense only one track. When the aircraft comes to about 30 nm, 
the track splits and another air track shows up on the screen. At this point, 
another enemy real track agent is created by the coordinated detachment attack 
track agent, but the control of the second enemy aircraft is under the first one. 
The first aircraft behaves as a wing commander in this scenario. When the 
aircraft split they detach from each other and fly 20° away from the previous 
course in different directions. The reason for this detachment is to prevent 
weapons coordination of the ship for self defense against the attack. When they 
are detached, the ship has to allocate different weapons and track radars for 
each of the aircraft. When the aircraft see the ship at their beam, they suddenly 
turn inbound and attack. This is called a coordinated attack. On top of the ship, 
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the two aircraft merge and split again when they complete the attack. About 20 
nm away from the ship these two aircraft merge once again and leave the area.  
 
Figure 20.   Coordinated Detachment Attack Profile 
 
5. Missile Attack Track Agent 
Air-to-Surface missiles (ASM) are the most dangerous airborne threat to a 
ship. They are fast, small, and difficult to detect and destroy. Additionally, they 
can be smart to avoid some of the Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) reactions 
of ship and they are high damage-capable. They can be released from an aircraft 
at about 40 nm away from the ship. This may make the ship’s proactive reaction 
plan useless because they may not destroy the missile platform before the 
missiles are released because the platform is out of the effective weapon range 
of the ship.  
The ADL Simulation has a special kind of agent to simulate the missile 
attack scenario. The missile attack track agent’s mission is to lead the aircraft 
toward the ship and release its missile about 40 nm away from the ship. Then 
they turn away and leave the area. At the missile release point another track 
shows up on the radar screen, and is controlled by the missile track agent. 
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6. Missile Track Agent  
The Missile track agent controls the missile track actions. We defined two 
types of missile profiles in the ADL Simulation. One of them is a sea-skimming 
attack missile and one is a pop-up attack missile profile. The sea-skimming 
missile flies just over the sea with an 80ft altitude. This prevents ship sensors 
from easily detecting and destroying it. The pop-up missile increases altitude 
suddenly at close range to the ship and then dives into ship. The reason is to 
drop explosive materials in the warhead of missile onto the ship to damage the 
ship’s sensor and weapon systems even if the missile is shot by the ship’s self-
defense systems. Missile track agents randomly pick one of these two modes 
when the track is created.  
 
7. User derived Track Agent 
We provided a user-derived track capability to the ADL Simulation to add 
diversity of tracks. The user can define the track and behaviors on the Tactical 
Figure Control Panel. The user can select its location, speed, altitude, IFF 
values, and radar emission parameters. The changes in the behavior of the track 
are determined by geographical location and use waypoints. The user can define 
as many waypoints as he wants.  
 
C. REACTIVE AGENTS 
For each factor we defined as being important for air defense, we 
implemented a reactive agent to monitor its relevant data and inform predictor 
track agents of any changes in the data. We identified 17 reactive agents, all 
individual threads. These agents are created by track agents. The 
communication between track agents and reactive agents is provided by the 
CMAS library. Since we defined a different membrane for each track agent, the 
connectors extended by a reactive agent of a track cannot find a match with any 
other track agent besides the one by which they are created. Besides the 
majority of the factors defined in Liebhaber and Smith’s research [29], we also 
defined our own factors as reactive agents in the ADL Simulation. 
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Figure 21.   ADL Simulation Layered Structure 
 
1. Airlane Reactive Agent 
An Airlane reactive agent continuously compares the aircraft’s location to 
air routes. Airlanes are standard commercial routes that civilian aircraft have to 
follow. Being on an airlane increases the probability that an aircraft will be civilian 
but it is not a guarantee. Airlane agents act differently under different threat 
levels. If the threat level is low, a reactive agent is more tolerant of an aircraft 
outside of an airlane.  
The communication between airlane reactive agents and track agents is 
provided by the CMAS library connectors and queries. This reactive agent uses 
an Integer connector to send its information to the track agent. The track agent 
has a query for this connector: “Is the aircraft on the airlane?” The airlane 
reactive agent’s connector matches with this query whenever reactive agent 
extends its connector.  
Airlane reactive agents behave differently for analog and digital selection.  
In both selections, the reactive agent opens a window around the air track. The 
height and width of the window are determined by the threat level; a low threat 
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level allows for a bigger window area. If digital is selected in the Analog & Digital 
Selection Panel, the Airlane reactive agent sets the connector to a 100 value 
when it finds a pixel in the search area occupied with an air route. Otherwise, the 
reactive agent sets the connector to zero. If analog is selected in the panel, the 
reactive agent looks for the nearest air route location in the search window. The 
reactive agent sets the connector with the value of the difference between the 
half of the diagonal distance of edges of window and the nearest range.  
 
2. ESM Reactive Agent 
Naval ships have an Electromagnetic Support Measurement equipment to 
detect electromagnetic emissions. Radio Frequency (RF) Radars have a 
fingerprint encoded in its frequency. If an ESM device detects this frequency and 
finds a match in its library, the ESM operator can identify the platform of the radar 
with its bearing. Civilian and military aircraft have specific navigation radars. 
Military fire-control radars and missile-seeker radars are working in higher 
frequencies than navigation and surveillance radars. In Liebhaber’s research, 
experienced air-defense personnel used the ESM factor as the major 
identification factor in experiments [30]. If an aircraft turns on its fire-control radar, 
it is an obvious sign of a preparation for an attack on a ship.  
Normally air-defense officers do not directly use the ESM equipment. An 
ESM operator uses this equipment, analyzes the data, and reports to the air-
defense officer. The ADL Simulation works the same way. ESM reactive agents 
act like an ESM operator and report any changes to the track agent after 
analyzing the radar emissions received from the air track. We defined five 









Civilian aircraft radar 
emission 
This is the typical civilian aircraft navigation radar. They 
usually work in low frequencies with respect to other 
kinds of radars. 
Military aircraft radar  
emission 
This is a typical military surveillance radar emission. 
The. ESM operator may identify the platform and 
possible threat to the ship based on this information. 
Military aircraft fire-
control radar emission 
Fire-control radar works at the higher frequencies to 
detect and track the target. The target can identify a 
“lock on” operation with ESM equipment. Lock on is a 
precondition of an attack on a ship.  
Missile seeker 
emission 
Missile-seeker radars work in higher frequencies than 
fire-control radars because they need more precision to 
increase the probability of a “hit”. Missile-seeker 
detection by an ESM device is a sign of an attack on a 
ship. 
No radar emission An aircraft has turned off its radar. 
 
Table 8.   ESM Reactive-agent Messages to Track Agent 
 
3. Heading-change Reactive Agent 
The heading-change reactive agent reports the changes to the heading of 
the aircraft. Reactive agents use different levels of tolerance under different 
threat levels; under high threat levels they report small changes to track agents 
while under low threat conditions they do not.  The reactive agent’s integer 
connector is extended when the heading change is more than the accepted limit 
based on the threat level status. In air defense, heading change becomes 
important when an aircraft suddenly turns inbound towards the ship to attack. In 
Liebhaber’s study, heading is the third most commonly used factor by air-defense 
personnel.  
 
4. IFF Reactive Agents 
IFF stands for Identification Friend or Foe. The IFF transponder devices 
are embedded in the aircraft and respond to the interrogations if they are on.  IFF 
values are set before the flight and may be changed by the pilot during the flight. 
IFF categories and functions are listed in Table 9. In the ADL Simulation, we 
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defined IFF-1, IFF-2, and IFF-3 reactive agents to track the IFF values of aircraft. 
These agents continuously interrogate the IFF values of the aircraft and report 
changes to track agents by extending their connectors.  
 
IFF Mode Concept 
Mode I IFF Mod I is used by military aircraft to show the mission of the 
aircraft. 
Mod II IFF Mod II is used to show the squadron of the aircraft that it 
belongs to. These numbers are unique and kept secret. 
Mod III IFF Mod III is used by both military and civilian aircraft. These 
values show which air traffic control is currently controlling the 
aircraft.  
Mod IV IFF Mod IV is an encrypted signal that can only be decrypted by 
a certain cipher. This cipher is kept secret and only friendly 
aircraft have the correct cipher. 
Mod C IFF Mod C shows the altimeter value of the aircraft. Not all the 
air surveillance radars are capable of three-dimensional signal 
processing. Therefore some of them can only locate the aircraft 
with ground reference systems.  
 
Table 9.   IFF System Modes and Concepts 
 
The IFF-4 reactive agent continuously interrogates the aircraft and reports 
the results to track agents if it is different from the previous interrogation.  When 
aircraft do not carry any IFF value to keep them undetected, IFF-4 becomes 
more important to recognize friendly aircraft.  The IFF transponder status reactive 
agent checks the IFF transponder of the aircraft and reports this information to 
the track agent. Normally, all civilian aircraft keep their IFF transponders turned 
on. Military aircraft may turn off their transponders to keep them undetected. 
 
5. Max Acceleration, Altitude, and Speed Reactive Agents 
Military interceptors and fighter aircraft can reach higher accelerations 
than civilian aircraft. The max acceleration reactive agent calculates the 
maximum acceleration of the aircraft and reports this value to the track agent 
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The altitude reactive agent checks the altitude of the aircraft and informs 
the track agents of the changes in the altitude of the aircraft. Civilian aircraft 
usually navigate between 30,000-35,000 ft. on airlanes. Civilian aircraft have a 
maximum altitude limit in their specifications and cannot fly above these limits. 
Some military aircraft are designed to fly at high altitudes to avoid detection by air 
surveillance radars. Therefore altitude is an important factor in threat 
identification.  
The max altitude reactive agent continuously checks the altitude and 
compares this value to current max altitude of the aircraft. If this value is 
changed, the reactive agent reports this change to the track agent with an Integer 
type connector. Some small aircraft and helicopters cannot fly over a certain 
altitude due to lack of sufficient air density. 
The maximum speed of an aircraft is another factor used to predict the 
type of the aircraft. Military aircraft have larger maximum speed than civilian 
aircraft. For example Boeing-type commercial aircraft speeds vary between 0.75-
0.9 mach (1 mach is 1067 km/h).  A reactive agent continuously checks the 
aircraft speed and compares this value with its max speed value.  
Commercial aircraft usually fly at 30,000 ft. altitude. They can cruise at 
lower altitudes only occasionally. However, for military fighters there is no limit for 
minimum altitude. A reactive agent checks the current altitude of the aircraft and 
reports this value if the current altitude is lower than the previously recorded 
minimum altitude. 
The speed reactive agent checks the current speed of the aircraft and 
reports this value.  The speed-change reactive agent continuously monitors the 
speed of the aircraft and reports significant speed changes. Its threshold values 
are determined by the threat level. Civilian aircraft usually maintain a specific 
speed during their cruise. Military aircraft speeds vary during the flight depending 




6. Origin Reactive Agent 
The Origin reactive agent compares the origin of the aircraft with the 
intelligence information about the threat-expected sectors. In the ADL Simulation, 
with a very high probability the friendly aircraft originate from the friendly country 
sector while hostile aircraft originate from the threat-expected sectors. Threat 
intelligence can be set or observed under the Intelligence menu option.  
Military aircraft carry a certain amount of load. This load includes fuel, 
weapons, and personnel. They can carry an extra tank for fuel to fulfill the 
requirements of the longer missions but then they cannot carry as many 
weapons. So military aircraft on strike missions carry a fuel amount as low as 
possible to fulfill the mission and carry as many weapons as possible. These 
aircraft take off, go directly to mission area, execute the mission, and return to 
the main base.   Hence determining the origin of an aircraft is important, and all 
aircraft that have taken off from or detected in threat-expected sectors are always 
suspect.  
 
7. Radar Status Reactive Agent 
The radar status reactive agent follows radar emissions. If there is no 
radar transmission, the reactive agent extends its connector to the track agent 
and reports the radar status.  
 
8 Random Number Finder Reactive Agent 
This reactive agent generates a random number representing a numeric 
error, used to make the simulation more realistic. The accuracy of the data 
received about an air track decreases with range because of signal losses due to 
transmission impairments. These impairments include free-space loss, 
attenuation, attenuation distortion, fading, and multi-path propagations. The 
random number finder reactive agent determines a random number limit for all 
other reactive agents. This limit is determined by the range of the air track. Figure 
22 shows the equation used to determine the error percentage limit in the ADL 
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Simulation:  We used 30 for constant A. the following equations are our 




Figure 22.   ADL Random Number Finder Reactive Agent Equation 
 
For sample ranges the equation gives the following error percentage 
limits. 
 






Table 10.   Sample Error Percentage Limits 
 
This means that at 128 nm range, the kinematics values that reactive 
agents receive from the air track are wrong 71% of the time in the ADL 
Simulation. Each time a reactive agent has to receive the kinematics values from 
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the air track, they pick a random number between 0-100. If this number is more 
than the random number limit value determined by random number limit finder 
reactive agent, they get the kinematics value as it is. Otherwise they receive the 
value with an error. The error value is also determined randomly and added or 
subtracted from the actual value. Constant A in the equation may be changed for 
the type of the air radar. Since this thesis is unclassified, we could not use the 
error rate of actual air-surveillance radars. But the value that we used makes 
error rates that are reasonable.  
 
9. Snooper Detector Reactive Agent 
The snooper is a special aircraft type whose mission is to collect 
intelligence about the location of friendly aircraft and report this information to 
enemy headquarters. The snooper stays out of the ship’s weapon range but most 
likely inside its sensory range. Snooper aircraft do not usually carry weapons to 
attack a ship. The presence of a snooper aircraft in the environment is a sign of a 
striker attack.  
The snooper detector reactive agent is responsible for identifying snooper 
activities. The typical behavior of snoopers is to stay out of weapon range and 
orbit in a specific area. Reactive agents keep track of the reported locations in a 
two-dimensional array.  We found the gradient magnitude of the locations of the 
aircraft to find the edges of the polygon that the aircraft is flying. We used four-
neighbor centered formula to find the gradient magnitude. We then connect these 
edges to figure out the polygonal area that the aircraft is flying. If the density of 
aircraft locations within this polygon exceeds a threshold, we assume it fits into a 





Figure 23.   Snooper Detector Reactive Agent Equation 
 
 
D. PREDICTOR TRACK AGENTS 
For each track in the environment one predictor track agent is created. 
The mission of track agents is to predict the identity and the potential intention of 
the aircraft. They have limited access to track data, to only the data that an air-
defense team in the CIC receives from the air track and intelligence. Predictor 
track agents can retrieve the kinematics of air tracks including location, speed, 
heading, altitude, IFF values and ESM detections.  
Predictor agents are located in the middle level of three-layer structure of 
the ADL Simulation. They receive the information from reactive agents and blend 
all this information to predict the identity of the aircraft. Predicted identity, 
detachment, detected snooper behavior, hostile activity, and location information 
are reported to regional agents via connectors.  
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1. Predictor Agent Connectors and Queries 
Predictor track agents use the CMAS library to communicate with both 
reactive agents and regional agents. The queries and connectors are as in Table 
11. 













Regional agent “What 
is identity” query 
Connector is extended only 






True/ False Regional agent “Is 
there Snooper” query 
Predictor agent extends this 
connector if snooper detector 






True/False Regional agent “Is 
there striker” query 
Predictor agent extends this 






A protocol between the predictor 
agent and the regional agent to 
transfer detachment information.  
Value=1000000 x track No+ 
             1000 x Location X + 
              Location Y 
 
Value=****-***-*** 
* : Track No 
* : X Location information 
* : Y Location Information 
Regional agent “Is 
there detachment:” 
query 
Predictor agent extends this 
connector when a heading 







Location information is transferred to 
other predictor agent. This value is 
used to recognize a split operation at 
the regional-agent level. 
Predictor agent “ what 
is location” query 
Predictor agent extends this 






Numeric threat level information. 
Threat level is received from regional 
agent. 
Reactive agents “what 
is threat level query” 
When threat level is updated 
by regional agent 
“Is it on airlane” 
Query 
The closeness to the nearest air route Airlane reactive agent 
airlane Integer type 
connector 
Airlane reactive agent 
extends its connector when 





Heading change of air track Heading change 
reactive heading-
change agent Integer 
type connector  
Heading-change reactive 
agent extends its connector 
when the heading change is 




Heading value of the air track Heading-change 
reactive agent Integer 
type heading connector 
Heading-change reactive 
agent extends its connector 
each time heading is updated 
“What is ESM” 
query 
Radar emission received from the air 
track 
ESM reactive agent 
Integer type ESM 
connector 
ESM reactive agent extends 
its connector when the radar 
emission received from the 
air track is changed 
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“What is speed 
change” query 
Change at speed of the air track Speed change reactive 
agent speed change 
Integer type connector 
Speed change reactive agent 
extends is connector when 
the change at speed exceeds 
a threshold value 
“What is max 
speed” query 
Max speed of the air track  Speed reactive agent 
max speed Integer type 
connector 
Speed reactive agent extends 
its connector when the speed 
of the air track is greater than 
current max speed 
“What is max 
acceleration” 
query 
Max acceleration of the air track Max Acceleration 
reactive agent max acc 
Integer type connector 
Max Acc reactive agent 
extends its connector when 
the calculated max acc is 
greater than current max acc 
“What is speed” 
query 
Speed of the air track Speed reactive agent 
speed Integer type 
connector 
Speed reactive agent extends 
its connector when the speed 
of the aircraft changes 
“What is IFF-1” 
query 
IFF-1 value of the air track IFF-1 reactive agent 
IFF-1 Integer type 
connector 
IFF-1 reactive agent extends 
its connector when the IFF-1 
value received from the air 
track is changed 
“What is IFF-2” 
query 
IFF-2 value of the air track IFF-2 reactive agent 
IFF-2 Integer type 
connector 
IFF-2 reactive agent extends 
its connector when the IFF-2 
value received from the air 
track is changed 
“What is IFF-3” 
query 
IFF-3 value of the air track IFF-3 reactive agent 
IFF-3 Integer type 
connector 
IFF-3 reactive agent extends 
its connector when the IFF-3 
value received from the air 
track is changed 
“What is IFF-4” 
query 
IFF-4 value of the air track 
(True/False) 
IFF-4 reactive agent 
IFF-4 Boolean type 
connector 
IFF-4 reactive agent extends 
its connector when the IFF-4 
value received from the air 
track is changed 
“What is IFF 
Transponder 
status” query 
IFF transponder status of the air track IFF Transponder status 
reactive agent IFF 
transponder status 
Boolean type connector 
IFF transponder status 
reactive agent extends when 
the status of transponder is 
changed 
“What is Radar 
Status” query 
Radar status of the air track Radar status reactive 
agent radar status 
Boolean type connector 
Radar status reactive agent 
extends its connector when 
the radar status is changed 
“What is 
altitude” query 
Altitude of the air track Altitude reactive agent 
altitude Integer type 
connector 
Altitude reactive agent 
extends its connector when 
the altitude of the air track is 
changed 
“What is max 
altitude” query 
Max altitude of the air track Max altitude reactive 
agent max altitude 
Integer type connector 
Max altitude reactive agent 
extends its connector when 
the altitude of the air track is 
greater than current max 
altitude value 
“What is min 
altitude” query 
Min altitude of the air track Min altitude reactive 
agent min altitude 
Integer type connector 
Min altitude reactive agent 
extends its connector when 
the altitude of the air track is 
less than current min altitude 
value 
“What is origin” 
query 




Origin reactive agent 
origin Integer type 
connector 
Origin reactive agent extends 
its connector once when the 







“Is it snooper” 
query 
True/False Snooper reactive agent 
“it is snooper” Boolean 
type connector 
Snooper reactive agent 
extends its connector when it 
decides that the behavior of 
air track fits into snooper 
behaviors 
“What is threat 
level” query 
Threat level of air warfare: 
0  White 
1  Yellow 
2  Red 
Regional agent “threat 
level” Integer type 
connector 
Regional agent extends its 
connector when it changes 
the threat level of air warfare 
“What is your 
position” query 
Position information of other tracks Predictor agents 
“Location” Integer 
connector 
Predictor agent extends its 




Track numbers of the air tracks 
involved in the merge operation 
Regional agent “merge 
occurred” Integer type 
connector 
Regional agent extends its 
connector when a merge 





Track numbers of the air tracks 





Integer type connector 
Regional agent extends its 
connector when a 
coordinated detachment 
operation is detected 
 
Table 11.   Predictor Track Agent Connectors and Queries 
 
2. Predictor Agent Competing Models 
There are five competing models inside each predictor track agent: 
Civilian, Unknown, Friendly, Suspect and Hostile. These models are created at 
the beginning of the simulation for each track as a ticket. At each cycle the 
predictor agent calculates the weight of these tickets. The model with highest 
weight for a track is the active model and predicted identity. Model weights for a 
specific track can be observed on the feedback panel in our implementation by 
selecting the air track. The Unknown identity is default active model with 0.5 
weight. All other models start with 0.0001 weight.  
 
3. Predictor Agent Tickets 
A predictor agent has two main kinds of tickets: identity and independent. 
We defined a ticket for each aircraft identity in the ADL Simulation. Independent 
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tickets are not related directly to identity tickets but the procedures they execute 
affect the data values of the frames of the identity tickets. 
A civilian identity ticket contains six data frames: the ESM frame, the 
altitude frame, the speed frame, the airlane frame, the IFF evaluation frame, and 
the origin frame. These frames except the IFF evaluation frame are set when a 
match occurs between queries and corresponding reactive agent connectors. 





Figure 24.   Civilian Ticket and Frames 
 
A Friendly identity ticket has four data frames: the ESM frame, the IFF 
evaluation frame, the origin frame, and the ATO frame. The ESM and origin 
frames are set by a match with corresponding reactive agent; the IFF evaluation 





Figure 25.   A Friendly Ticket and Frames 
 
The Hostile identity ticket has ten data frames: the ESM frame, the range 
frame, the altitude frame, the airlane frame, the CPA frame, the origin frame, the 
IFF evaluation frame, the speed frame, the max speed frame, and a combination 
of the altitude, range and CPA frames. All frames except the IFF evaluation, 
CPA, and combination frames are set by a match with corresponding reactive 
agent connectors. Others are set by independent tickets.  
 
Figure 26.   Hostile Ticket and Frames 
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A Suspect identity ticket has five data frames: the IFF evaluation frame, 
the altitude frame, the origin frame, the speed frame, and the max speed frame. 
All frames except the IFF evaluation frame are set by corresponding reactive 
agent connectors. 
 
Figure 27.   Suspect Ticket and Frames 
 
An Unknown identity ticket has two data frames: the IFF evaluation frame 
and the ESM frame. The ESM frame is set by the ESM reactive agent while the 
IFF Evaluation frame is set by the IFF Evaluation independent ticket.  
 
Figure 28.   Unknown Ticket and Frames 
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The ADL Simulation has also four independent tickets. Once these tickets 
are completed they are blended anytime one of their frame data value is 
updated. These tickets are completed when all its data frames are set. The 
independent tickets are the IFF evaluation ticket, the CPA calculator ticket, the 
ATO ticket, and the combination ticket for hostile identity. These tickets create 
their own local integration networks and eventually connect with the identity 
tickets integration network.  
 
Figure 29.   Connecting Local Independent Ticket Integration Network to 
Identity Integration Network 
 
An IFF Evaluation ticket has four data frames: IFF-1, IFF-2, IFF-3, and 
IFF-4. These frames are set by reactive agent connectors. An IFF Evaluation 




Figure 30.   IFF Evaluation Independent Ticket 
 
The CPA calculator ticket has only one frame: heading change. Anytime a 
heading-change reactive agent extends its connector, the CPA calculator 
independent ticket calculates a new CPA value based on the new heading value 
of the air track. The ATO Evaluation ticket has six frames: IFF-1, IFF-2, IFF-3, 
heading, location, and time frames. These frames are set by corresponding 
reactive agent connectors. When one of the frames is set, the ticket is executed 
and the result sets the ATO Evaluation frame of identity tickets. The Combination 
independent ticket has three data frames: Altitude, CPA, and range frames. The 
CPA frame is set by CPA calculator independent ticket and others are set by 
corresponding reactive agents. If aircraft is inbound, its range is close, and its 
altitude is low, a combination ticket sets the combination frame of the hostile 
ticket to true. That adds extra weight to the hostile identity ticket.  
 
4. Weighting Procedure for the Predictor Track Agent 
The Predictor track agent calculates the weights of each identity ticket. 
The ticket with the highest weight becomes the active model and predicted 
identity of the track.  
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a. Weighting the Civilian Ticket 
The expected ESM behavior from a civilian aircraft is either a 
civilian navigation radar emission or no radar emission. If one of these values is 
received from ESM reactive agent the weight is increased, otherwise decreased. 
The affect of the air track’s altitude is different for digital and analog 
selection of the simulation. For the digital evaluation, the threshold values are 
25,000 and 35,000 ft. since civilian aircraft usually fly between these levels. 
Therefore if the altitude of the air track is between these levels, the weight of the 
civilian ticket is increased. If analog evaluation is selected, the formula 
5*exp(Altitude*0.0001) is used to calculate the altitude addition to weight of the 
ticket for altitude values less than 35,000 ft. 
If the aircraft is on airlane the weight is increased if digital 
evaluation is selected. If analog evaluation is selected, airlane reactive agent 
sets the connector with a value proportionate to the range of the nearest air route 
point to location of the air track. If aircraft is not on airlane, the weight is 
decreased because it is a requirement to follow air routes. 
The typical speed value for civilian aircraft is between 0.76-0.89 
mach. If digital evaluation is selected, the acceptable spectrum for civilian aircraft 
speed is between 400 and 500 knots. If analog is selected for evaluation, the 
formula 100*sin((Speed-400)*1.81) is used to find the value to add the weight of 
the ticket for the speed values between 400 and 550 knots.  
If the aircraft took off from a place not in the threat-expected sector, 
the weight of the ticket is increased. The IFF evaluation independent ticket 
evaluates the current IFF values and finds a weight for civilian ticket. All these 
weights are added up and normalized to find to total weight of the ticket. 
 
b. Weighting the Friendly Ticket 
ESM devices carry radar fingerprints in their libraries. If the ESM 
operator finds a match with a known fingerprint, he can tell even the name of the 
platform. In the simulation we assumed that our ESM library is not complete yet. 
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Therefore in a friendly ticket, the ESM frame only distinguishes military and 
civilian aircraft, and among the military aircraft it distinguishes the ones with 
hostile intention.  
In the simulation, we assumed that all the friendly aircraft take off 
from a place with a very high probably that a threat is not expected. The threat-
expected sector is defined before the simulation is started. If an aircraft takes off 
from a safe place, the friendly ticket’s weight is increased, otherwise decreased. 
The IFF evaluation ticket evaluates a weight for friendly ticket for the current IFF 
values. The ATO evaluation ticket checks the aircraft behaviors with all friendly 
missions defined in the ATO. If there is a mission in ATO that matches with the 
actions of the aircraft, the weight is increased. The total weight is then 
normalized. 
 
c. Weighting the Hostile Ticket 
Air-defense personnel identify most of the threats against ships by 
using ESM devices. Missile-seeker radar, a fire-control radar locked on the ship, 
or military surveillance radar searching in the area are all signs of a threat for the 
ship. For that reason, the ESM frame in hostile ticket has more effect on the 
weight of the ticket than other frames. 
Air defense of a ship goes from the highest priority threat to lowest 
priority one. Highest priority threats are the ones that show an immediate threat 
against ship. They are usually the ones closest to ship. The range frame 
evaluates the range and increase the weight of the ticket based on the range of 
the aircraft. If digital evaluation is selected, the range is compared to a threshold 
value. If range is less than that threshold, the weight is increased. The threshold 
value can be set on the range threshold setting panel under Evaluation menu 
option. If analog evaluation is selected the formula 100*exp(-0.015*Range) is 
used to find the range effect on weight of the ticket.  
The Altitude frame is also evaluated differently based on the 
selection of analog or digital. If digital evaluation is selected, we defined three 
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threshold values of 10000, 20000, and 30000 ft. The ticket adds a different 
weight based on the altitude value of the air track. If analog evaluation is selected 
the formula 150*exp(-Altitude*0.0001) is used to find the weight. 
The Airlane frame is set by airlane reactive agent. The weight of 
airlane frame is the inverse of the value that the reactive agents set the frame. 
The closer to airlane is the less weight for airlane frame of hostile ticket. 
For the CPA distance frame, if digital evaluation is selected, a 
threshold value is used to determine the weight of the frame. This threshold 
value can be set on the CPA threshold selection panel under the Evaluation 
menu. If analog evaluation is selected the formula 150*exp(0.02*CPA) is used to 
calculate the weight of the frame.  
The speed frame of the ticket is another one evaluated based on 
the selection of analog or digital approach. If digital evaluation is selected, speed 
is checked against a threshold value. This threshold value can be set on the 
Speed Threshold Selection Panel dropdown menu under the Evaluation menu 
option. If speed is greater than threshold the weight of the ticket is increased. If 
analog evaluation is selected, the formula 15*exp(0.02*(speed-450)) is used to 
calculate the weight of the frame.    
Most hostile activities originate from the threat-expected sector. 
Therefore the weight of hostile ticket is increased for air contacts originating from 
a hostile direction. The IFF Evaluation ticket calculates a weight for the hostile 
ticket based on the current IFF values of the air track. We also used a 
combination frame (subframe) of three frames of the hostile ticket. If air track is 
inbound at low altitude at close range, the weight of the air track is increased. 
These three frames behave like an internal ticket inside hostile ticket. If the max 
speed of the air track is more than expected max value from a civilian aircraft the 




d. Weighting the Suspect Ticket 
We used the same algorithm for evaluating the altitude, speed and 
maximum speed frames of the suspect ticket as the hostile ticket frames for both 
digital and analog evaluations selections. Suspect identity is a first step of hostile 
identification. Air-defense officers usually first identify an air track as suspect if 
there is not much hostile activity evidence. As the hostility evidences increases, 
then they identify the track as hostile.  
 
e. Weighting the Unknown Ticket 
There are only two frames in the unknown identity ticket. The 
Unknown identity is default identity for any emergent track on the radar screen. 
This means that there is not much evidence to identify the air track as one of the 
other four identities. Air-defense officers do not tend to leave this identity on air 
track for long and they try to change it as soon as they can. For that reason we 
defined only two frames for this ticket, the ESM frame and the IFF evaluation 
frame. 
 
f. Execution of the ATO Ticket 
The ATO ticket sets the ATO frame of the friendly identity ticket. 
After the ticket is completed the following pseudocode is executed in the ticket: 
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Figure 31.   Evaluation  of ATO Frame of Hostile Ticket 
 
g. Execution of IFF Evaluation Ticket 
The IFF Evaluation ticket has four IFF frames. The execution of the 
ticket means finding the meaning of combination of four IFF frames. IFF Mod I 
and IFF Mod II may be set or not set. If they are set they may be right or wrong. 
That makes total of three possibilities for each IFF Mod I and IFF Mod II. IFF Mod 
III may be set or not set; hence there are two possibilities for IFF Mod III. IFF 
Mod IV may be right or wrong. These conditions create 36 different combinations 
for IFF Evaluation ticket.  
1
3 3 2 2 36
IFFModI IFFModII IFFModIII IFFModIV× × × =
 
We defined a table for all these possible combinations. This table 
includes a weight value for each identity ticket for each combination. IFF Frames 
of identity tickets retrieve these weights. The air-defense team on a ship does the 
same procedure for IFF checking: Once the aircraft responds to IFF 
interrogations, the air-defense team checks the received IFF values with the 




h. Execution of CPA Ticket 
The CPA ticket calculates the CPA distance of an air track. The 
CPA is the closest point that the air track will pass by the ship. The ADL 
Simulation’s inbound decision about an air track depends on the CPA distance. 
The CPA ticket first finds the real bearing of the ship from the air track. The ticket 
then finds the difference between this bearing and heading value of air track. The 
heading value is provided by heading reactive agent heading connector. If the 
difference is 90° the current point is the closest point. If it is more than 90°, the 
closest point had already been passed otherwise the tangent of the difference is 
the CPA distance of the air track. This value is provided to CPA frames of identity 
tickets.  
 
i. Split Activity Detection 
The split activity detector ticket has two location frames. The first is 
set by another predictor track agent location connector. This connector is set 
once by the other predictor track agent when the other track is first created. The 
other location frame is set by track location data and the ticket is executed. If the 
other track location is found close to the first track location, a split connector is 
extended. The track numbers of tracks involving into split operation is then 
broadcast to all predictor track agents via split connector.  
 




E. THE REGIONAL AGENT 
The regional agent works at top of the layered structure of the ADL 
Simulation. There is only one regional agent in the simulation. Its mission is to 
find coordinated activities between tracks and regional activities involving more 
than one track. We defined three regional agent activities in the simulation: 
Snooper supported attack activity, coordinated detachment activity, and merge 
activities. In a snooper supported coordinated activity, at first snooper appears in 
the environment. It is believed that snooper reports the ship location to air force 
units and then enemy air force strikers comes into the environment to attack the 
ship. This is a coordinated activity between snooper and a striker. In a 
coordinated detachment activity, there are two enemy aircraft involved. Both of 
them act in coordination when they are turning. Merge activity is the joining of the 
two tracks. Based on these activities, the regional agent determines the threat 
level and broadcasts it to all track agents via threat level connector.  The 
connectors and queries of regional agent are as follows: 
 











Predictor track agent 
“What is threat level” 
query 
Connector is extended when 







 A protocol between regional agent and 
predictor agent to transfer coordinated 
detachment information.  
Value=1000 x track No 1+ track No 2 
  
Value=****-**** 
* : Track No 1 
* : Track No 2 
Predictor agent “Is 
there coordinated 
detachment” query 
Regional agent extends the 
connector when there are two 
different detachment activities 






 A protocol between regional agent and 
predictor agent to transfer coordinated 
detachment information.  
Value=1000 x track No 1+ track No 2 
  
Value=****-**** 
* : Track No 1 
* : Track No 2 
Predictor agent “Is 
merge” query 
Regional agent extends the 
connector when there are two 




Identity of the air  track Predictor track agent 
Identity Integer type 
Connector 
Predictor agent extends the 





True/False Predictor track agent 
snooper connector  
Predictor track agent extends 
the connector when a 
snooper typical behavior 
detected 
“Is there striker” 
query 
True/False Predictor track agent 
striker connector 
Predictor track agent extends 
connector when predicted 




Detachment information of the air track.  
Value=1000000 x track No 1+ 
            1000 x Location X + 
             Location Y 
  
Value=****-****-**** 
* : Track No  
* : Location X 




Predictor track agent extends 
the connector when the track 
changes its heading 
“What is 
location” query 
Location of the air track 
Value=1000000 x track No 1+ 
            1000 x Location X + 
             Location Y 
  
Value=****-****-**** 
* : Track No  
* : Location X 
* : Location Y 
Predictor agent my 
location connector 
Predictor agent periodically 
extends its location connector 
 
Table 12.   Regional Agent Connectors and Queries 
 
The regional agent has three tickets: the snooper detector ticket, the 
merge detector ticket, and the coordinated detachment detector ticket. The 
snooper detector ticket has two frames: a snooper frame and a striker frame set 
by predictor agent snooper and striker connectors. The merge detector ticket has 
two location frames set by my location connectors of predictor agent. The 
coordinated detachment ticket has two detachment frames.  
The snooper detector ticket is completed by setting both of its frames. The 
snooper frame should be set before the striker frame is set. Therefore this is a 
synchronous ticket. Once the snooper frame is set, a striker query is extended by 
the ticket. The ticket extends its snooper coordinated activity connector when the 
striker frame is set after snooper is set. This is a typical engagement with a third 
party unit where the snooper plays the role of a target report unit. After a snooper 
is detected in the area by one of the predictor track agents, the threat level is 
increased to yellow if it is white since the existence of a snooper in the area is the 
sign of upcoming strikes. This is called generalization in blending theory. 
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Figure 33.   Regional Agent Snooper Detector Ticket 
 
The merge detector ticket is executed each time location information is 
received from one of the predictor agents. One of the frames is set by this match 
if this is not the first location report to the regional agent because a track reported 
for the first time cannot merge with another track. Other frames are set by other 
track locations in sequence. The ticket is then executed for each other track 
location. The merge connector is extended if the ticket finds another track 
location with a close distance and similar altitude to first frame location and 
altitude. The first frame is a data frame holding the location data of the reporting 
predictor agent’s track, and other frame is a procedural frame executing the ticket 
for all other track locations 
The coordinated detachment detector ticket finds two detachment 
activities reported by predictor agent that are close ranges to ship at close times. 
Each time a predictor agent reports a detachment activity, this activity is stored in 
a data structure and ticket compares the reported detachment to all detachment 
activities in this data structure. The data structure is a stack and data traverse 
starts from the last imported data. When ticket cannot find a match within an 




F. BLENDING THEORY AND THE ADL SIMULATION 
As we discussed in Chapter II, Conceptual Blending Theory has three 
operations: composition, completion, and elaboration. Composition attributes 
outer relations between mental spaces. Completion uses generic spaces, an 
existing knowledge base, and experience. Elaboration blends input mental space 
information with generic spaces, finds an emergent structure, and projects this 
structure to blend space [31].  
One of these blending operations in the ADL Simulation is in detecting 




Figure 34.   Merge Detector Blending Operation 
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In the blend operation shown above, the ADL Simulation defines three 
outer vital relations. They are space vital relations including location information, 
altitude information and the contemporaneous time vital relation. The input 
mental spaces are the two different tracks. Under the rules of generic space, 
merge activity is projected to blend space. The organizing frame for the two input 
spaces is an air track organizing frame. Only location, altitude and time elements 
of mental spaces participate in the composition operation of blending theory. 
Later these three elements perform the completion operation of blending theory 
by applying the values of elements with the rules of generic space. If rules match, 
merge activity is projected onto blend space. This blending operation exemplifies 
the mirror network of the four network types of Gilles and Turner since both 
organizing frames are same [32].  
In the snooper supported coordinated attack scenario, we used the cause-
effect vital relation in blending. The cause is the snooper and effect is the 
upcoming attack operation on ship. The emergent structure in blend space is a 
coordinated attack of at least two aircraft. The attacker aircraft should be in the 
environment after the snooper is observed. The threat level is broadcast to all 
predictor agents. This is called a generalization operation in blending theory. 
Making a decision to increase the threat level is another blending operation 
where part-whole vital relation is used. The whole is the coordinated attack on 
ship supported by the snooper. Since the regional agent recognizes the whole, it 
increases the threat level. This is the third operation of blending theory, 
elaboration.  
We defined three of the blending operations of the ADL Simulation above. 
These blending operations are parallel to linguistic blending operations that we 
described in Chapter II. Besides their vital relations we created our own vital 
relations in the ADL Simulation. Composition is one of the operations of blending 
theory and finding these relations is the focal point of performing composition 
operation. Attributing these vital relations is another important point of operation. 
We managed to link these elements of input mental spaces via CMAS library in 
the simulation. Connectors and corresponding queries are the relations between 
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different mental spaces. In case of a split operation, when an air track is created, 
Track II extends its location connector. This connector finds a match with 
corresponding query of all other tracks in the same membrane and blending 
operation is performed. When a split operation is found between two tracks the 
predictor agents then change their tolerance limit for changes on the behavior of 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
85 
VI. RESEARCH QUESTIONS RESULTS AND THE EVAULATION 
OF THE SIMULATION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Overview 
During the research we examined four sets of issues: the level of reality of 
the ADL Simulation, the level of precision of decisions given by the model, the 
level of closeness to the decisions given by the air-defense personnel, and the 
effect of analog versus digital decision-making processes on the simulator.  But 
the model is not ready to be embedded into current tactical warfare systems 
because more careful work is needed on many of the details. Our purpose is to 
get insight into the decisionmaking process and to show the possibility of 
implementing a model working close to the way that the human brain works for a 
specific task.  
 
1. General Testing Methodology 
 Tests used the following default variables: 
Range threshold value:  25 nm 
Speed threshold value:  500 knots 
CPA threshold value:  15 nm 
 
We ran the simulation 10 times for each test, which resulted in 190 runs. 
10 runs tested the level of reality of the ADL Simulation, 90 runs tested the level 
of closeness to the way human brain works with analog decision-making, and 90 
runs tested digital decisionmaking. We limited each scenario time period to 5-6 






Scenario No Scenario 
1 5 civilian aircraft with/without threat intelligence  
2 3 civilian aircraft and 1 friendly aircraft with/without threat 
intelligence 
3 3 civilian, 1 friendly, and 1 hostile aircraft with/without threat 
intelligence 
4 2 civilian, 1 hostile, 1 snooper, and 1 friendly aircraft with/without 
threat intelligence 
5 3 civilian aircraft and a coordinated detachment attack 
with/without threat intelligence 
6 3 civilian aircraft and a missile attack with/without threat 
intelligence 
7 3 civilian aircraft and a terrorist attack with/without threat 
intelligence 
8 3 civilian aircraft, 1 missile, and a coordinated detachment attack 
with/without threat intelligence 
9 3 civilian aircraft and a terrorist attack with/without threat 
intelligence 
 
Table 13.   Scenarios Used in the Simulation Test and Analysis 
 
We used an approximate uniform distribution of Java API for random 
number selection.   
 
B. THE LEVEL OF REALITY OF THE ADL SIMULATION 
We allocated time to implement a realistic user interface and environment 
for the ADL Simulation as much as we did for the implementation of the cognitive 
model. We believed that only a simulated environment as close as possible to a 
real environment would give us accurate results. In this test we analyzed how 
well the real track agents behave based on their roles in the simulation. The ADL 
Simulation was tested by two air-warfare officers (AAWO), two principal warfare 
officers (PWO), and 3 Air Force pilots. We ran the simulation ten times with 
different scenarios for each subject in tests. In general all of them supported the 
reality of the simulation. Their main criticisms were: 
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• One expert criticized the lack of issuing warnings to air contacts.  
• Two experts stated that it would be more realistic if the ship had 
movement capability.  
• Two experts criticized the lack of a task air-defense missions. We 
restricted the simulation to only one ship, but agree that air defense 
is not the responsibility of only one ship. Information transformation 
via tactical systems is paramount for establishing a real-time 
tactical air picture. However to simplify the simulation we eliminated 
Link services.  
• Three experts criticized the reference system used in the 
simulation. We used an (x,y) coordinate system and avoided real-
world reference systems to minimize the computation in the 
simulation. 
• Four experts declared that the civilian, snooper, coordinated 
detachment attack, and missile-attack agents behaved as they 
should. They said that the behaviors of the friendly and hostile 
aircraft could be made more realistic. We agree with that criticism. 
However since this research is unclassified, we avoided real attack 
scenarios and missions but used the attack scenarios in game 
technologies.  
The experts confirmed that the simulation is close to a real environment 
and its capabilities. However we had to simplify our simulation in some cases to 
decrease the computation.  
 
C. THE ACCURACY OF THE DECISIONS BY THE ADL SIMULATION 
We recorded the actual identities of the aircraft in each simulation and 
then compared them with the predictor track agent’s predicted identities. We ran 
the simulation ten times for each nine different scenarios. Table 14, Table 15, 
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5.68 7.315 4.665 5.157 
Variance 
(s²) 
32.269 53.519 21.77 26.597 
 
Table 14.   Civilian Aircraft ID Results of Tests 
 
Table 14 shows the identification time of a civilian aircraft under four 
different circumstances. We found out that when a threat is expected, the time to 
identify a civilian aircraft is increased. When analog processing techniques were 
used, the model identified the civilian aircraft more quickly. With analog 
techniques we also found out that the weights of the competing models were 
close to each other. We believe that by using analog processing techniques, the 
system is more stable because the weights of competing models were kept close 





















5.324 4.135  4.722  4.606 
Variance 
(s²) 
28.347 17.1  22.301  21.222 
 
Table 15.   Friendly Aircraft ID Results of Tests 
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Table 15 shows the time that the simulation took to identify the friendly 
aircraft under four different circumstances. The results show that when a threat is 
expected, both processing techniques identify the friendly aircraft in a shorter 
time. This result supports the results of Liebhaber’s research. Another result is 
that an analog processing technique identifies the friendly aircraft in a shorter 
time. A further result is that the standard deviation is decreased when a threat is 
expected in the environment.  
 
 
6 Minute Scenario  



















Mean 11.3 11.52 13.3 11.059 
Standard 
Deviation (s) 




































(sec) Variance (s²) 282.501 8078.89 3535.427 3053.343 
 
Table 16.   Hostile Aircraft ID Results of Tests 
 
Table 16 shows the time that the simulation requires to identify an aircraft 
as hostile and suspect, and the time that the simulation requires to identify an 
aircraft as hostile under four different circumstances. The results show that 
analog processing techniques identify the hostile activity in a shorter time. When 
a threat is expected the model identifies the hostile activities in a shorter time. 
During the tests, we found out that the simulation identifies hostile activities as 
hostile and suspect the majority of the time. The tests showed analog processing 
techniques identify hostile activity faster than the digital processing techniques 
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do. When the threat is expected, the digital processing techniques identified the 
hostile activities less than suspect identification. We observed that the simulation 
identified hostile activities in close range, especially when the track is in the 
range threshold value which has a 25 nm default. Another interesting result 
achieved during the tests is that when the aircraft is far from the ship, the model 
tends to identify the air contact as suspect, but as the contact approaches the 
ship the model changes the identification from suspect to hostile.  
 
D. THE LEVEL OF CLOSENESS OF DECISIONS GIVEN BY THE MODEL 
TO THE DECISIONS GIVEN BY THE EXPERTS 
 
We worked with two PWOs and one AAWO while testing the closeness of 
the decisions of the model to decisions of the real air warfare personnel. We ran 
each of nine simulations for each of the expert twice, once with threat intelligence 
and once without threat intelligence. We asked them to talk continuously while 
they made decisions to catch the factors affecting the decisionmaking process. 
We recorded their voice on a tape recorder. During the tests, the datalog option 
was also kept “On”. We then compared the factors used by the user with the 
factors used by the model.  
The results showed that all the factors used by the subjects were a subset 
of the factors defined in the ADL Simulation. However it was clear that ADL 
Simulation was ten times faster than human decisionmaking on the average. 
That proves our motivation for the ADL Simulation that we need computers with 
their high speed processing capabilities in time sensitive areas such as air-
defense of a naval unit.   
The results of the tests also showed that decisions made by the ADL 
Simulation were the same as the experts made. We also observed that the 
procedure of the experts in threat assessment is checking the factors affecting 
the decisionmaking and comparing them with expected values for each identity in 
their minds, as observed in Liebhaber’s research.  
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VII. FUTURE WORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR 
DEFENSE LABORATORY SIMULATOR 
A. FUTURE WORK INTRODUCTION 
The ADL Simulation was inspired by a previous thesis written by Sharif 
Calfee. We believe that ADL Simulation will have a similar effect on the 
subsequent research. In fact our second goal of replacing the human factor in 
threat assessment could be accomplished in the next few years. The ADL 
Simulation has also reached the point in which we can create our integration 
network and traverse in the network in assisting the human air-defense officers 
with threat assessment.  
 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
We simplified some of the details to reduce the computation time of the 
simulation. The simulation could be enhanced upon by adding movement 
capability to the ship. The environment could also be improved by adding a 
geographical reference system into the model. If this feature is added to the 
simulation, by which a user could also add actual maps to the simulation.  
We defined only one surface ship in the environment. The simulation 
could be enhanced by adding more surface ships. The coordination between 
ships and the task-force air defense is another component to be examined in the 
development of the model. We defined the missions of friendly military aircraft as 
either a path or area mission, but did not specifically implement any of the 
missions. This may make the simulation more realistic in terms of the variety of 
aircraft behaviors.  
 
C. INTEGRATED KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER  
The ADL Simulation is able to create an integration network and retrieve 
the mental spaces by using the CMAS library. Each time the simulation is run, 
the integration network is created again in the simulation. A valuable 
improvement to the simulation is the transfer and addition of the created 
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knowledge from another simulation's or another agent’s knowledge base. This 
can also be labeled as “experience transfer”. The problem of transferring a 
knowledge base to another is a compatibility issue. However the ADL Simulation 
uses the CMAS library to traverse the integration network. The only requirement 
of the second environment to be compatible with an attached knowledge base 
from another environment is the ability to use the CMAS library and use the 
same queries. The ADL Simulation is ready to transfer an isolated part of 
integration network to another agent in another environment. The transfer of an 
isolated part of the integration network created in one agent to another agent is a 
huge step for agents in gaining experience and then transferring this experience 
to other agents. This is like what teachers do to students at the school or what 
experienced personnel do to a new hire.  
Transferring knowledge to another agent would enable us to explore 
another interesting research issue. It is clear that experienced air-defense 
personnel use a greater knowledge base than novice air-defense personnel use. 
The traditional method of seeing the effects of using a novice person in air-
defense or any area will slow down the simulation process or extract certain 
numbers of rules from the simulation. However this process does not create the 
real results because slowing down the thinking process of an agent or banning 
an agent to use its existing knowledge base would not simulate the real world 
situations. In the future, if only a portion of the integration network is transferred 
to an agent, this portion would represent the novice air-defense personnel, we 
can get the realistic results from the simulation. 
  
D. THE ADL SIMULATION AS A TRAINING TOOL  
The ADL Simulation has two modes of operation: User mode or model 
mode. The user mode was originally implemented for test purposes. We used the 
user mode of the simulation to compare model-based decisions and human air-
defense decisions. This could be improved to make the ADL Simulation a training 
tool for air-defense personnel. The model can determine the experience level of 
the air-defense personnel by measuring the level of usage of created integration 
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network inside the simulation. While experienced air-defense personnel would 
use the entire integration network, novice personnel would use only a portion of 
the integration network of the model. The differences could be clue to determine 
the experience level of the air-defense personnel and lead us in a certain 
direction to train personnel.  
 
E. IMPLEMENTING THE ADL SIMULATION WITH BAYESIAN METHODS  
We used integration networks for the solution to the problem. There are 
other ways to model air defense. One of them is using a Bayesian method. The 
probability of an event in Bayesian method is the frequency of observed 
occurrence in a sample.  A simulation could be developed by using Bayesian 




























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
95 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Air Defense Laboratory Simulation is a software program that models 
the way an air-defense officer thinks in the threat assessment process.  It uses 
multi-agent system technology and is implemented in the Java programming 
language. We created integration network and modeled the decisionmaking 
process of an air-defense officer by using Conceptual Blending Theory and the 
CMAS library which implements it. The CMAS library has the facility of 
connectors and queries to create the integration network. Each node of the 
integration network is a mental space, information packets. These packets are 
connected to each other via connectors of CMAS library.  The model of the 
Simulation can retrieve the required data of any mental space of the integration 
network and use them to create new mental spaces. Newly created mental space 
is then attached to end of integration network. We represented the integration 
network in a tree structure so that a human user can traverse on this tree and 
see the decisionmaking process step taken by the cognitive model.  
The development of the ADL Simulation demonstrated that using 
computers in time-sensitive areas like air-defense as assistant to air-defense 
personnel improves the success rate. We demonstrated that the ADL Simulation 
is also faster than human decisionmakers and can be used as an assistant to 
them in threat assessment. In long term, the ADL Simulation might serve as a 
basis for replacement of humans in threat assessment.  
We demonstrated that the usage of a blending theory originated in 
linguistic can be used in computer science field successfully. The usage blending 
theory in the ADL Simulation is not complete yet but we managed to start 
implementing our software with this theory. We are confident that by using 
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